The Varieties & Illusions of Religious Experience: Chapter 4, Masters of Suspicion

In the last three essays we have been examining accounts concerning the biological, sociological, and psychological functions of religious belief. I've been arguing that functional accounts of religious belief present unique and potent challenges to defenders of faith. In this essay I'd like to dig a little deeper into that claim.

i.
The work of thinkers such has Marx, Darwin and Freud has been influential in creating what has been called "the hermeneutics of suspicion." In cultural studies, the hermeneutics of suspicion suggest that when we approach an interpretative event we need to be careful not to attend too closely to the overt "meaning" of the event. That is, the obvious, surface-level meaning of a text or event might be misleading. Worse, it might be hiding a sinister or oppressive mechanism. Thus, the hermeneutics of suspicion recommends that we approach the act of interpretation suspiciously, and even cynically. We must be slow to accept the obvious and direct interpretation. We must work to determine if there are ulterior or countervailing motivations. Motives that might be oppressive or less than virtuous.

Take, as an example, a Norman Rockwell painting of a Thanksgiving meal:

How should we interpret this painting? Overtly, the painting is simply an expression of nostalgia, conjuring up memories of family life. But a more suspicious approach would be to see potential for oppression in the painting. The Rockwell painting promotes a kind of domestic ideal: Father knows best and women are domestic servants. That is, the painting isn't simply about happy Thanksgiving memories. The painting is choosing sides in a debate about the structure of American homes and the relationships between men and women. A Rockwellian ideal might be deployed as a subtle form of oppression.

Of course, many of us recoil at this point. We say, "Come on, can't I just enjoy the painting as a nice depiction of family life?" Sure you can. All I'm trying to illustrate is how the hermeneutics of suspicion might operate with a given "text" (e.g., a Rockwell painting). One can see how this approach might be applied to art, literature, values or the writing of history. For example, what is the true "meaning" of the presidency of John F. Kennedy? On the one hand we have the hagiographic accounts of Camelot. JFK as American hero and martyr. Some biographies of JFK take this approach. Others, informed by a hermeneutics of suspicion, dismiss the veneer of Camelot (the overt "meaning") and delve into the darkness of the JFK presidency. Instead of a hero they find a sex crazed child of privilege. The goal of these "suspicious" biographies is to dismantle the Camelot myth. The "truth" of the JFK era is to be found at this darker level.

Admittedly, the suspiciousness of modern academic work can get wearisome. Nothing is ever what it seems. The "truth" is always sinister, selfish or oppressive. But we should be clear that the hermeneutics of suspicion has performed heroic, moral work. This method of interpretation has helped and continues to help uncover and expose ways that women or races or other oppressed groups have been exploited or oppressed. The hermeneutics of suspicion is at the vanguard of social justice.

ii.
Why are Marx, Freud and Darwin often considered to be Masters of Suspicion? Marx, Freud and Darwin are seminal figures in the hermeneutics of suspicion because their work led the way in showing how the overt meaning of a phenomenon hid deeper causal dynamics, dynamics that were more sinister or selfish. Marx, Freud and Darwin created the tools of suspicion. They were the first wizards in the practice of these dark arts.

To illustrate, let's examine each thinker in turn. Let's begin with Darwin. Prior to Darwin one could look at the beauty and design of Creation and see loving, directed beneficence. This, even to us, is the overt "witness" of Creation. Who isn't stunned by the beauty and intricacy of the animal kingdom? But after Darwin a darker vision was unfolded. The design and beautiful coloration is found to be the product of so much waste and death. All this beauty was produced by a random, dumb and brutal mechanism.

And it gets worse than this. Take, for example, a Darwinian take on an act of heroism. Imagine I'm walking by a lake and see a person drowning and calling for help. Without thinking, I jump in to the rescue. In an act of altruistic self-sacrifice I put my life at risk to save a complete stranger. The "overt" meaning of this event appears to be one of heroic altruism. But what might a Darwinian take on this event look like?

The Darwinian account of my act of heroism begins with kin selection. Imagine during human evolution a gene arises that codes for altruistic behavior. If my individual person is the locus of natural selection then this altruism-gene is doomed to failure. Why sacrifice my reproductive future to save others? It seems that natural selection would punish altruism and reward selfishness. But natural selection doesn't work at the level of the individual. It works at the level of the gene. And the gene for altruism can survive if it protects copies of itself in other bodies. This notion is called inclusive fitness. That is, the effect of a gene should be evaluated on how well it protects both itself and other copies of itself in the gene pool. Inclusive fitness is most powerful in small kinship groups, the hunting-gathering context where most of human evolution occurred. Genes are widely shared within kinship groups. Thus, if an altruism-gene arises in a kinship context that gene is likely shared with brothers, sisters, parents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The gene motivating sacrificial behavior (in war or against predators) is actually not acting altruistically at all. It is acting selfishly, protecting its copies in the gene pool. You, an individual carrier of one copy of the gene, might die. But that's an acceptable "sacrifice" as long as the kin group survives. You are acting sacrificially, but the gene is acting selfishly. This mechanism, known as kin selection, is what creates the massively altruistic behavior in the social insects.  And, presumably, in humans.

How does this explain me jumping into the lake to save a stranger? Genes coding for behavior tend to create instinctive heuristics, general behavioral rules that tend to produce good outcomes. In the hunting-gathering context a general altruistic impulse would have evolved via kin selection as most of the people in my tribe would have at least some genetic relationship with me. If I see someone drowning in a lake I should dive in because, odds are, this person is related to me. Such a behavioral impulse is simple and effective, just the kind of instinct (i.e., help the people around you because, odds are, they are relatives) that could emerge via natural selection.

So humans, via kin selection pressures in the hunting-gathering context, acquired a generalized impulse to help anyone they saw in distress. In the past, this person, statistically speaking, was a relative. Thus, this generalized inclination toward helpfulness was adaptive. This is to say, the impulse was selfish. It aided survival. On the surface the helping act seems altruistic and heroic, but that would miss the underlying selfish genetic mechanism.

The "real" reason I jump into the lake is (genetic) selfishness. But my stone age brain, having evolved in small kinship clans, is now living in an anonymous urban environment. My instincts are misfiring. With the rapid rise of urban contexts the adaptive architecture of the brain (e.g., help the people around you as they should be relatives) is now misfit. In today's modern urban context when I jump into the lake odds are I'm not going to be saving a relative. I'm going to be saving a stranger, someone genetically unrelated to myself. In short, my action is a mistake. A misuse of a mechanism that was once adaptive. Not that I had time to think through any of this. I acted instinctively and dove right in. The instinct was innate and automatic. But the genes coding for that instinct are not "aware" that we are no longer living in close-knit kinship clans.

I am not suggesting that this kin selection account of modern day altruism is accurate. I'm simply demonstrating how Darwinian thinking creates suspicion by appealing to selfish (genetically speaking) mechanisms. Overtly, we see an act of altruistic heroism and self-sacrifice. But Darwinian thought causes us to examine ulterior genetic mechanisms, mechanisms that are pushed and pulled by self-interested forces. Clearly, one can see how Darwinian thought creates tools for suspicion and cynicism. Schematically, here is how Darwinian suspicion works:

Overt Level: Altruistic Sacrifice
Underlying Mechanism: Genetic Selfishness

Similar tools of suspicion were created by Marx and Freud. For Marx, the values and structures of modern economies were forms of class oppression. Overtly, the story of history was one of moral progress and advancement. Thus, the masses are fed stories in school about how the values and structures of this Well-Ordered Society are both optimal and just. But these values and structures are not optimal and moral. They are decidedly immoral, forms of class oppression. Thus, Marx read history suspiciously and what he found was oppression. Similar to Darwin, we can see the tool of suspicion created by Marx:

Overt Level: The Moral, Liberal and Well-Functioning State
Underlying Mechanism: Class Oppression

Freud created similar tools of suspicion. For Freud, our waking conscious life was actually being driving by subterranean, unconscious sexual and aggressive drives. Humans, at root, are animalistic. Psychic defenses help repress and redirect these primal forces, often into valued goods. But our life projects and products are being driven by dark forces. Creating art is just sublimated sex. Success in the world of work is just sublimated aggression. In short, for Freud:

Overt Level: Civilized Existence
Underlying Mechanism: Primitive Sexual and Aggressive Drives

iii.
After Marx, Freud and Darwin it is hard not to look at the world suspiciously. These thinkers have made us acutely aware of subterranean mechanisms, hidden agendas and ulterior motives.

Obviously, the hermeneutics of suspicion are regularly applied to religious subjects. Let's consider two commonly discussed examples.

The statements St. Paul makes concerning gender in his letters in the New Testament are often read suspiciously. Read literally and naively, Paul is simply transmitting divinely inspired truth about proper gender relations. Read suspiciously, Paul is expressing the patriarchal attitudes common during his time. This reading is rendered more acute given the fact that Paul was single and couldn't speak firsthand about marital dynamics. Using our summary schema:

Overt Level: God's Plan for Men and Women
Underlying Mechanism: Paul's Patriarchalism and Misogyny

Consider, as a second example, the Council of Nicaea, called together by the first Christian Emperor Constantine. During Nicaea critical decisions were made about the Christian canon and orthodoxy. Read naively, one could look at Nicaea as a Holy Spirit led discussion that discerned God's Truth for the Christian faith once for all time. Read suspiciously, however, Nicaea was a massive powerplay where marginal groups, like the Gnostics, were decisively crushed. Further, Constantine's goals in Nicaea were not, at root religious. Constantine needed the Christian factions to come together to formalize his new state religion. This formalization would consolidate Constantine's power and reduce religiously motivated violence in his kingdom.  Nicaea wasn't a religious event. It was a political event:

Overt Level: Spirit-Led Creation of Canon and Creed
Underlying Mechanism: Creation of State Religion to Consolidate Political Power

Of course, one can reject the validity and explanatory value of these suspicions readings. But we can clearly see the deflationary power of the hermeneutics of suspicion. First off, suspicious readings are reductionistic. That is, by specifying a lower-level mechanism the suspicious account attempts to reduce the overt phenomenon to the mechanism. The mechanism "explains" the overt happenings at this lower level. Second, this "explanation" is typically cynical. The mechanism is self-interested or oppressive.

iv.
The the last four essays I've been arguing that functional accounts of religion present distinct challenges for classic apologetics. I've said that functional accounts tend to be deflationary by ignoring the creedal content of faith (e.g., Did Jesus rise from the dead?) to specify the functional mechanisms of faith. I think we can now see why this is the case. The functional accounts we've been discussing resemble the hermeneutics of suspicion. The overt contents of faith and religious experience are ignored in favor of a functional, lower-level account. This functional account, as we've seen above, is both reductionistic and cynical. It attempts to "explain" faith by positing a less-than-noble mechanism for its existence.

In the preceding essays the functional account that has most preoccupied us is the Freudian/Marxist formulation that religion is a form of existential consolation (per Freud), an opiate producing an "illusory happiness" (per Marx). The overt metaphysical content of faith, its creedal assertions, should be read suspiciously. The focus should be upon the consolation those beliefs produce (e.g., life after death). Schematically:

Overt Level: Creedal/Metaphysical Contents of Faith
Underlying Mechanism: Existential Consolation

As discussed in the very first essay, this formulation calls for a unique response from the Christian apologist. The battle isn't going to be fought at the overt, metaphysical level. The question isn't about theology. It is, rather, a question of psychology. A rebuttal of the Freudian/Marxist claim would involve a rejection of the assertion that religion is functioning as a mode of consolation. And that is not a theological or metaphysical fight. We are, rather, evaluating rival empirical claims about how religious belief is functioning in the minds of real people. Either Freud is right or he's not. To use Freud's words, either faith is functionally a narcotic or it's not. If Freud is correct, a strong deflationary, suspicious critique of religion is in play. It's not decisive, but it's damning evidence. Very damning. But if Freud is wrong, the Freudian/Marxist formulation of religion-as-wishful-thinking can be effectively shelved or parried.

So which is it?  

That is the question that will occupy us as we go forward.