A Proof for the Authenticity of Faith

The epigraph of my book The Authenticity of Faith, from which the title of the book comes, is a quote from Abraham Joshua Heschel: 

It has long been known that need and desire play a part in the shaping of beliefs. But is it true, as modern psychology often claims, that our religious beliefs are nothing but attempts to satisfy subconscious wishes? That the conception of God is merely a projection of self-seeking emotions, an objectification of subjective needs, the self in disguise? Indeed, the tendency to question the genuineness of man’s concerns about God is a challenge no less serious than the tendency to question the existence of God. We are in greater need of a proof for the authenticity of faith than of a proof for the existence of God.

I use Heschel's quote to describe what I call in the book a "new apologetic," what could be described as "the Freudian turn" in modern apologetics. 

What do I mean by "the Freudian turn," and how does this turn change the shape of Christian apologetics?

In Freud's account of religious belief in The Future of an Illusion faith is described as an existential defense mechanism. As Freud put it, "the effect of religious consolations may be likened to that of a narcotic," a pain-numbing and pleasure-giving drug. 

As Heschel points out, this changes the conversation. If religious beliefs "are nothing but attempts to satisfy subconscious wishes," then we need a different sort of apologetical argument. Where traditional apologetics focused upon "proof for the existence of God," today we need, as Heschel puts it, "proof for the authenticity of faith." Such a proof would speak to the motivations of belief itself, with specific attention to unconscious and neurotic motivations.

Here's how I describe the Freudian turn to my students. Where traditional apologetics focuses upon the reasonableness of Christianity Freud turned to question the reasonableness of Christians.  

The point being, maybe there are good arguments for the existence of God, and maybe there are not. But this wouldn't matter to Christians. For Christians are going to be believe no matter what. Facing the evidences for God's existence, or lack thereof, Christians go in with a ton of motivated reasoning (reasoning from a conviction rather than toward a conviction) and confirmation bias. More simply stated, traditional apologetics exists for the already converted.

Now, a common retort here is, true, I might believe in God for defensive, neurotic reasons. Belief may be protecting me from existential dread. But even if that is true, it does not follow that the belief is false. The psychological origin of a belief is distinct from its truth or justification. Still, the Freudian turn does raise a serious question about if you, as a believing Christian, can be trusted to evaluate evidence and argument in an unbiased way. And in the face of those concerns, you're effectively barred from giving evidence in your own defense. The upshot is that the believer is treated as epistemically compromised in a way that makes their own testimony, especially about their underlying motivations, inadmissible as evidence.

Which lands us back with Heschel's ask: We are in greater need of a proof for the authenticity of faith than of a proof for the existence of God.

Now, when I wrote The Authenticity of Faith in 2012 we were coming out of peak New Atheism. So the question posed by Heschel was timely. But today, I think the question has morphed.

Specifically, while it seems that the New Atheism moment has passed, I do think we're witnessing a lot of anxiety and defensiveness among many Christians. Religion is less culturally stigmatized, but the faith of many Christians is marked by a great deal of out-group hostility. A classic sign of neurotic defensiveness. Consequently, Heschel's ask remains pressing. Here a proof for the authenticity of faith would show up in a faith that displayed non-anxiousness, humility, fallibility, kindness, hospitality, joy, and generosity. These fruits and virtues are largely missing in culture-war Christianity, and it suggests to me that Freud's diagnosis continues to hit a target.

The issue today, therefore, is no longer simply whether Christians believe for defensive reasons, but how that defensiveness is expressed in the posture of belief itself. A faith driven by existential and neurotic anxiety is brittle and oppositional. It is a Christianity that requires enemies. It is a faith that polices boundaries. It is a mode of belief that cannot risk doubt. Consequently, the question of authenticity moves from unconscious motivations to visible social fruits. The test is less about belief itself than the sort of person being produced by those beliefs. For when belief manifests less as peace and more as hostility, less as hospitality and more as fear, then Freud's suspicion returns and demands to be taken seriously.