In the years since, I’ve kept returning to Kilby’s argument. Her cautions about political projection—the temptation to baptize our preferred social visions with divine authority—have become even more compelling. I’ve also kept circling back to a question that remained unresolved at the time: whether, and in what sense, the Trinity carries positive social, relational, or political implications.
To start, we need to review the debate between classical versus social trinitarianism, and how social trinitarianism lead to the maxim "the Trinity is our social program."
Classical trinitarianism is notoriously abstract. The Nicene consensus insists that God is one substance (ousia) and three persons (hypostases). The doctrine of the immanent Trinity—the life of God in se—is complex, arcane, and difficult for most Christians to grasp.
Social trinitarianism emerged in the last century in the work of theologians like Jürgen Moltmann and Miroslav Volf, partly as a response to the abstractions of classical trinitarian theology, but also to challenge the way that doctrine had historically been used to justify hierarchy, empire, and colonial projects. Its central move was to emphasize relationality: what binds the Trinity together is love, expressed dynamically in perichoresis, often described as the “divine dance” of mutual indwelling and self-giving. In this way, the Trinity became more than a metaphysical puzzle—it became a vision of harmonious, self-giving love, a pattern for human relationships and social life.
This relational vision is then pressed into the social and political sphere. If God is relational and communal, human communities should reflect this mutuality. Families, friendships, organizations, communities, and nations were called to emulate the Trinity’s pattern of existence. The slogan “the Trinity is our social program,” popularized by Miroslav Volf, expresses this vision. The Trinity becomes a source of moral and social inspiration, a model to which human institutions should conform.
It is against this background that Karen Kilby’s critique takes shape.
According to Kilby, social trinitarians had made the doctrine tangible and compelling, but in doing so, they ran the risk of projection: reading their preferred politics into the divine life and then claiming God as the source and warrant of their political vision.
In her essay, Kilby traces the typical pattern this argument would take:
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Introduce the Trinity as a society of persons:
“Most basically, social theorists propose that Christians should not imagine God on the model of some individual person or thing which has three sides, aspects, dimensions or modes of being; God is instead to be thought of as a collective, a group, or a society, bound together by the mutual love, accord and self-giving of its members.”
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Make perichoresis attractive:
“God is presented as having a wonderful and wonderfully attractive inner life. I already mentioned Moltmann’s notion of ‘the most perfect and intense empathy’ existing between the persons. Another proponent… writes of the Trinity as ‘a zestful, wondrous community of divine light, love, joy, mutuality and verve,’ where there is ‘no isolation, no insulation, no secretiveness, no fear of being transparent to another.’”
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Project social ideals onto the world:
“In the hands of these thinkers, then, the claim that God though three is yet one becomes a source of metaphysical insight and a resource for combating individualism, patriarchy and oppressive forms of political and ecclesiastical organization… not a philosophical stumbling block but something with which to transform the world.”
Again, Kilby calls this a problem of projection. We project our preferred social and political visions onto God—and then turn around and claim God’s inner life as a justification for those same visions:
“Projection, then, is particularly problematic… because what is projected onto God is immediately reflected back onto the world, and this reverse projection is said to be what is in fact important about the doctrine.”
Kilby's caution here is prophetic. She concludes:
“Theologians are… free to speculate about social or any other kind of analogies to the Trinity. But they should not… claim for their speculations the authority that the doctrine carries within the Christian tradition, nor should they use the doctrine as a pretext for claiming such an insight into the inner nature of God that they can use it to promote social, political or ecclesiastical regimes.”
Let me give a concrete example of how this projection works. For example, some theologians argue that democratic socialism is more relational and mutual than free-market capitalism. From there, it becomes “trinitarian”: socialism is read as more aligned with the pattern of love and mutuality in the Trinity, while capitalism is cast as less so. A straight line is drawn from the Trinity to a particular political arrangement. To be clear, my sympathies are more socialistic than capitalistic. So I like this line of argument. But I'm alert to Kilby's caution and concern about how “the Trinity is our social program” can be used to give divine sanction to preferred political positions, turning the Trinity into a mirror of my politics.
Kilby’s alternative is apophatic trinitarianism. Apophatic theology emphasizes God’s mystery, the impossibility of speaking definitively about God, and the way human descriptions inevitably fall short. Kilby writes:
“The doctrine of the Trinity… does not need to be seen as a descriptive, first order teaching… It can instead be taken as grammatical, as a second order proposition, a rule… for how to read the Biblical stories, how to speak about some of the characters… how to deploy the ‘vocabulary’ of Christianity in an appropriate way… its importance lies in structuring Christianity rather than providing a picture of God’s nature.”
Her point is sobering. Human analogies—perichoresis as a divine dance, love as a model for human society—can be beautiful, but they can never be literal. Even John of Damascus, after describing perichoresis, concludes:
“It is impossible for this to be found in any created nature.”
This is where Kilby haunts me and why I keep returning to her essay. Do we get too literal, too cozy, too confident in drawing direct lines from the Trinity to politics? Kilby's apophatic approach is a powerful reminder that idolatry remains a constant temptation whenever we speak about God, especially for political purposes. As Kilby remarks in her talk "Trinity and Politics: An Apophatic Approach" this is actually one political takeaway from her position, that we should be wary of any totalizing political system and ideology. She says:
If one cultivates an awareness of the ungraspability of God, the impossibility of finding an image, or model, or integrating vision of the the Trinity, if one cultivates the capacity to live with questions to which we have no answers, might this be correlated, not with a particular political commitment to one form of socio-economic system or another, to one social vision or another, but with a resistance to an absolute confidence in any system and any social vision? Economic and political regimes do, after all, tend to take on a sacred aura. They tend to demand unconditional commitment, to imagine themselves as the end and goal of history. If Christians are schooled by the doctrine of the Trinity, as well as in other ways, to know that God is not within our grasp, that we possess no concept or overarching understanding of that which is highest, then we are in a sense schooled into suspicion of systems that present themselves with a kind of sacred, all-encompassing necessity.
So might we not imagine that an important political contribution of Christian thinking about God be then, not that it provides us with something like a shortcut to formulating a distinct alternative of our own, but that it helps us call in question, helps relativize, all such systems that we find we might be enticed by? Might there not be a correspondence, in other words, between a resistance to idolatry in relation to God and a resistance to ideology in relation to political systems?
This is excellent, and a much-needed reminder. But it still leaves the pressing question: does the Trinity have any positive social, relational, or political implications? Kilby’s apophatic trinitarianism makes me nervous because, if pushed too far, it risks rendering the Trinity morally, socially, and politically inert—precisely the problem she is trying to resist. If the Trinity becomes an apophatic vacuum, it can be co-opted or ignored, deployed to justify almost anything. The apophaticism of the Trinity would promote political quietude, allowing it to exist comfortably alongside any regime, good or evil. If the Trinity has nothing to say about our politics, then anything goes.
In the face of this concern, I do think there is a way to connect the Trinity to our politics, and Kilby herself points the way. She is correct that words like perichoresis give us no window into what the Trinity is in se. This is an observation about the immanent Trinity, the mystery of God’s very life. But that’s not all we have when it comes to the Trinity. We also have the economic Trinity—the revealed and visible actions of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in salvation history.
In short, I think Kilby is wrong to assume that we are only ever drawing from human models of love and relationality and then projecting those onto the Trinity. Of course, we do this a lot, and whenever we do, we risk idolatry, using God to justify our preferred politics. But that’s not all we are doing. When I think about God, I am mostly engaging with the revealed actions of the economic Trinity to understand what the immanent Trinity might be like. Rahner's rule applies: The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. To be sure, this is a fraught process—temptations to idolatry lurk on every side—but when it comes to the Love that exists between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, something of that Love has come into view in Jesus Christ. And that Love, I would argue, gives us a glimpse of what perichoresis might be like. Not because it exists in any created thing, but because the Trinity has entered into human history and made itself visible.
Having made itself visible, I think we can most definitely say that this Love carries relational, social, and political implications. Kilby herself gestures toward this in her talk “Trinity and Politics,” where she focuses on the Incarnation and the political implications of first-hand engagement with brokenness and suffering. Her point is subtle, and it stays true to her apophatic approach: Jesus’ engagement with oppression does not yield concrete policy proposals. Politics at a given time and place are too historically and contextually dependent. But what Jesus’ engagement does reveal—and reveals to me as I follow him to the cross—is a clear sense of what is broken and dislocated in the world.
As Kilby points out, we are never lacking in totalizing systems or high-altitude analyses. Political think tanks abound. Elites always have answers about how to fix the world. The trouble isn’t that we lack political opinions, it’s that our opinions often lack a direct, gritty engagement with what is actually happening “on the streets.” Following Jesus to the cross keeps me on the streets, close to the suffering, close to the people and stories that are often invisible in centers of power. Phrased simply, my politics is blind without the cross.
Thus, I would describe Kilby’s approach as an incarnational politics—a politics that starts with, and stays close to, the suffering and pain of the world. Yes, there may be diverse and competing policy proposals about how to ameliorate that suffering, but an incarnational politics keeps my attention focused on this hurt and perpetually engaged in its healing.
All that to say, when it comes to politics, Kilby turns to the economic Trinity. Grounded in the Incarnation, I would argue that there is a Trinitarian politics. And while this does not give me concrete, one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions, it does shape how I engage politically in the world: humble, attentive to the hurt, close to the pain, incarnational, and rooted in the Love revealed in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
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