Showing posts sorted by relevance for query luck. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query luck. Sort by date Show all posts

Work & Luck: Thoughts on Outliers

There has been a great deal of talk lately among the radio and TV punditry about "socialism" in America. In religious circles this conversation tends to take on moral overtones. It is claimed that capitalism rewards work and punishes laziness. By contrast, socialism, it is believed, enables laziness and vice.

Take the issue of taxes. A "capitalist" claims that taxes are unfair. Why tax people who work hard and make money? Why "redistribute wealth" by giving money to the idle and lazy? According to the "capitalist", taxes are unfair and immoral. By contrast, the "socialist" claims that success in life isn't solely the product of hard work. Lots of luck is involved. Not everyone gets into law school or medical school. Not everyone is born with good looks, talent or a high IQ. Not everyone gets born into good families and school districts. And not everyone can be at the top. There is only one Google or Microsoft. Hard working competitors are just out of luck if they come in second place. To succeed you must, by definition, succeed at someone else's expense. Thus, it is only fair and moral that you share the fruits of your success with the people you climbed over.

Work versus Luck. This is issue is often at the root of the debate over taxation or government interventions to level the playing field. Both ideologies make good points. No doubt hard work is implicated in success. But so is luck. Consequently, how one views the taxation debate is largely the product of how one views the causal forces behind success.

Into this debate steps the book Outliers: The Story of Success by Malcolm Gladwell. I love Gladwell's work and would recommend his two others books--The Tipping Point and Blink--along with Outliers.

Outliers is a book about success. And what impresses me about the book is that, chapter by chapter, it portrays the interplay between work and luck in the creation of success.

Let me give some examples. First, let's look at work. Chapters 2, 8, and 9 of Outliers are odes to work. For example, Chapter 2 is about the 10,000 Hour Rule, the notion that true expertise in a given area can only be attained after one has put in 10,000 hours of practice. Take Tiger Woods as an example. Clearly he's talented. But the story of Tiger Woods is largely about his childhood. You can't explain Tiger Woods without talking about his father and Tiger's commitment to practice as a child and adolescent. Point to any other "genius" (e.g., Mozart, Bobby Fisher, The Beatles) and you'll find, behind the talent, 10,000 hours of practice. In short, success involves hard work. Drudgery. Commitment. Sweat.

Chapter 8 picks up on that same theme. In Chapter 8 Gladwell tackles the puzzle of Asian excellence in math. Are Asians genetically superior to Americans and Europeans in the area of mathematics? Rather than pointing to genetics to explain the standardized test score gap between Asians and Whites Gladwell tells a story of work. It is largely a cultural story, a tale of the work ethic of the rice patties. To understand this story one needs to understand the agriculture of rice patties. Basically, rice is very difficult to grow, requiring hour-by-hour year round vigilance and sweat. Which is very different from Western agriculture (plant the corn, pray for rain, and take the winters off). The cultural rice-farming legacy is captured by an Asian proverb, "No one who can rise before dawn three hundred sixty days a year fails to make his family rich." Rice farming is about year round, hour-by-hour work.

Gladwell's argument is that success at math is largely a matter of work. Math is hard. And it takes persistence and sweat. Asians, shaped by the cultural ethic of the rice patty, simply work harder than American school kids on mathematical subjects. When American school children encounter difficult math problems they quickly give up. Asian children tend to work the problem and work the problem. Just like you work a rice patty. In short, Asians are "better" at math than American school children because Asians work harder. It's not genetic. It's work.

This lesson finds an American application in Chapter 9 when Gladwell takes up the successes of the KIPP Academy in New York City. KIPP is a middle school that produces outstanding students from inner city populations. The key to KIPP's success is simple: Work harder. The KIPP kids start school earlier, end later, and have shorter summer vacations. KIPP kids are swamped with homework. They work late into the night and get up early for the earlier start time to the school day. And the outcome? Success. The lesson for American education couldn't be clearer. Want better standardized test scores? Want to compete educationally with other nations? Work harder. Longer school days. More homework. No summer vacations. It's simple. Work harder.

In short, Outliers preaches the value of work. And this seems to support the no tax ideology. Success goes to those who work.

But Outliers is not so simple. Outliers pushes against the myth of hard work by devoting chapters to the role of luck in success. Take, for example, Chapter 1. The story of Chapter 1 centers on the ages of professional hockey players. In the 1980s Canadian psychologist Roger Barnsley noted a curious phenomenon while looking through the program at a professional hockey game. Specifically, Barnsley observed that most of the hockey players on both teams were born in the months of January, February, or March. Now why would hockey player birthdays cluster in these three months? Well, the answer has to do with the cutoff dates in the Canadian youth hockey system (an American example would be Little League baseball). The age cutoff in Canadian youth hockey is January 1. So imagine two kids born two days apart. One is born on January 2, just missing promotion, and is, thus, the oldest and likely biggest kid in his league. The other is born on December 31. This kid is promoted up to the higher league as the youngest, and likely smallest, kid in the advanced league. A two day difference in birthday makes you the smallest or the biggest kid in your league.

Now talent isn't correlated with age. You can be the youngest and the best or the oldest and the worst. But being older is an advantage in pre-adolescent sports. Being older means that, on average, you are bigger, stronger and faster. This translates into more ice time (or more innings). And, remembering the 10,000 Hour Rule, the clock starts ticking. That small advantage begins to grow over the years as the slightly older kids get more game time and opportunities for All Star or touring seasons (highly competitive off-season practice and games). A small, initial lucky advantage rapidly inflates to create a real disparity of skill on the ice. Work is involved, but it's also a matter of luck. Just look at the birthdays of professional hockey players.

In short, work and luck are intimately intertwined. Those professional hockey players are talented. Genetics is a part of it. And they also have practiced and worked really hard. Work is also a part of it. But they also had the perfect birthday to give them a slight edge over their peers. Luck was a part of it.

Given that talent is also a matter of luck (think of that sibling who is better looking, more athletic or smarter than you) we simply cannot discount the role of luck in success. This is not to discount the role of work. Far from it. Success does involve work. But small turns of fate, like a birthday, can have huge implications. The successful should be praised and emulated. They have worked hard. But they did not earn their genes. And they have also been lucky. The successful cannot claim all the credit.

The reason I'm interested in the role of luck is that I hear a lot of religious people railing against the rise of "socialism" in America. But I think it is very clear, the case in Outliers as one example, that personality, work ethic, religious affiliation and income are impacted by luck. Consequently, all I am and all I own isn't solely due to my virtue or work ethic. I'm not good, I'm fortunate. Importantly, luck implies success at someone else's expense. I got the break and you didn't. You're a janitor and I'm a millionaire professional athlete (or CEO, Dr., or whatever). Consequently, it seems right and just that I share.

How much should I share? I don't know. Where is the balance here? How much luck is involved? How much work? When are the taxes too low or too high? Again, I don't know. All I'm arguing is that the socialistic move isn't, on the face of it, immoral or unfair. It's realistic as far as I can tell. I don't mind debates about taxes or entitlements. But I do mind an ideological stance that automatically and unthinkingly equates taxation or "socialism" as evil. Why? Because it assumes life is all merit, work and virtue with no luck involved.

Why I am a Universalist, Part 4: Moral Luck


We now come to one of the biggest reasons for why I’m a universalist: Moral luck.

In my opinion, moral luck poses the most significant theological problem to classic formulations of Arminian systems (i.e., we are saved or damned by a choice we make: accepting Jesus as our atoning sacrifice). I don’t think the ACU community has yet come to fully wrestle with the theological problems regarding moral luck. This, despite years of my good friends Drs. Paul Morris and Fred Aquino repeatedly articulating the problem on campus. Our very smartest students see the problem, but few theological solutions are proffered on the ACU campus. Thus, many of these students grow disillusioned with Christianity. They see moral luck as a deal breaker.

Well, let me add my attempt to deal with moral luck head on.

What is moral luck? Well, Steve Allison from the blog Out of the Depths made this insightful comment two posts ago:

I would say that my journey to universalism began while a student at Harding, in part as a result of mission trips I made to Europe between my sophomore and junior years. From that experience I derived a sense of the role that environment plays in one's view of reality and religious beliefs. How could it be that an honest mistake based on centuries of tradition like getting sprinkled or attending a church where an organ was played could lead to one dancing on the griddle for ever and ever? A person's heritage growing up can never be escaped. How can a Jewish person whose whole family perished in the holocaust objectively consider Jesus? How can a person born in a hovel somewhere in the 3rd world be held accountable if they never hear or happen to ignore a few radio broadcasts telling them about Jesus?

Well, that’s it, that’s moral luck. More formally, moral luck is when a person is assigned moral blame or moral praise for an action when the person did not have full control over the action (see here for more). Or, as I like to frame the issue, moral luck recognizes that we are contingent beings. That is, the fortunes of birth, heredity, and circumstance (e.g., the dominant religion of your nation or family) dramatically shape who we are. Small changes in circumstance can radically alter our futures (for those who know about chaos theory, call this the “moral butterfly effect”).

If you are a believing Christian consider this:

How likely is it that you would convert to radical, militant Islam?

Not very likely I bet. But consider the symmetry of the situation:

How likely is it that you could covert a radical, militant Islamic person to Christianity?

Not very likely.

So, according to free will doctrines of soteriology (e.g., Arminianism) you, the Christian, go to heaven and the Islamic person goes to hell.

But is this a fair and just outcome? True, you accepted Jesus from an act of will, you could have chosen differently. But, you must admit, you were also extraordinarily lucky. As Kant said:

"And how many there are who may have lead a long blameless life, who are only fortunate in have escaped so many temptations."

Fortunate to be born in America. Fortunate to have had the experiences you did during your formative years. And so on. If you were born as a young, poor male in Iran, well, I doubt you’d be a Christian right now.

Consider another scenario, a terrible one:

You are sexually abused by a leader of a church.

Well, let’s imagine that this experience, an all to common one, decisively poisons a person against God, faith, and the church (and I’ve seen this happen many times, haven’t you?). Can you blame this person? Was this experience in anyway their fault? A horrible lighting strike (metaphorically speaking) hit this person and overwhelmed them. Yet, according to free will systems, this person is going to hell. Doesn’t matter that a monster harmed them while representing Jesus. Those are just the breaks.

Well, I can’t see a just and loving God working in this fashion. A loving and just God is going to have to deal with our contingent histories, to remove moral luck from the salvation equation. But how can he do this if death interrupts our moral development? Truly, there just isn’t enough time in this life to correct many of our contingent histories. So what does God have to do? I’ll tell you:

He has to defeat Death. He has to defeat The Scourge of Humanity.

See, Death’s Sting isn’t just about dying, although that is bad. It’s about running out of time. About death trumping God’s efforts to eradicate sin and sanctify creation. Death is a moral clock. And it’s ticking.

But here is the witness of universalism: God is governed by no clock. He doesn’t run out of time. His love never fails.

Romans 8:38-39
For I am convinced that neither death nor life, neither angels nor demons, neither the present nor the future, nor any powers, neither height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God that is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Are you convinced of this?

I am.

Love Wins: Part 2, What about the Flat Tire?

By my count, there are two ways you can end up in hell.

The first way is that God predestined for you to be there. In the second way, in contrast to the first, God wants you to be in heaven but you reject God's offer of grace. That is, you're in hell because that was your choice.

(There's actually a third way of going to hell involving Las Vegas, three chickens and a circus clown. But it's a rare that anybody goes this route.)

I grew up believing in the second way of going to hell. Specifically, I believed (and still do!) that God "wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth." (1 Timothy 2.4). If this is so, it stood to reason that if you ended up in hell you had rebelled and rejected God during your life. God wanted to save you, extended the gift of grace, and you rejected it.

When I was young, this explanation seemed perfectly cogent and reasonable. God makes a gracious offer. You refuse. You reap the consequences. Sure, hell is bad. But we shouldn't blame God. Everyone had their chance.

Or did they?

From time to time at ACU I've led a chapel where I've asked students the following question: If you had one question you could ask God what would it be? What question of faith keeps you up at night?

Overwhelmingly, having done this with hundreds and hundreds of college students, the responses fall into one of two groups: The problem of suffering and the problem of moral luck. Based upon my sampling, I'd wager that these are the two biggest stumbling blocks to faith: The problem of suffering and the problem of moral luck.

The title of Chapter 1 of Rob Bell's Love Wins is a question about moral luck: "What about the Flat Tire?" This question is associated with a discussion in the chapter about how we can expect people to accept Jesus if they have never heard the good news or if the "news" brought to them is messed up (i.e., a distortion of the gospel) or delivered by a faulty messenger (e.g., some huckster faith healer or hypocritical preacher). Basically, Bell is highlighting the contingencies inherent in the process of evangelism. So he writes:

If our salvation, our future, our destiny is dependent on others bringing the message to us, teaching us, showing us--what happens if they don't do their part?

What if the missionary gets a flat tire?
This is the flat tire of the title. It's not the only issue, problem or question Bell raises in this ramble of a chapter where he asks question after question. But the tire functions as a sort of metaphor, a metaphor for moral luck.

Moral luck is a termed coined by the philosopher Thomas Nagel. Moral luck refers to how we extend moral approbation and disapprobation to people, thinking people "good" or "bad", when many of the factors affecting our judgements these people fall outside of their control. Some people are perceived as "good" when, in fact, they are simply very fortunate. Others are deemed "bad" when, in fact, they are mainly very unlucky.

"Who sinned, this man or his parents?"
"Neither."

Some of this is fairly straightforward. I might accidentally hit a child playing in the street with my car. Wrong time. Wrong place. And that death hangs over my head. Sometimes accidents happen and sometimes those accidents have a moral cloud.

That's unfair of course. If it was an accident there should be no moral blame involved. And yet, we aren't very good at keeping that distinction clear. Ever feel guilty for something that was out of your control?

And the picture gets even more complicated when start to think about accidents of birth. Some of us are raised in Christian, flag-waving, American homes. Some of us are born to devout and patriotic Muslim families in Iran. How quickly do the kids from those two homes make their way to Jesus? Not to say that radical change and conversion isn't possible. Biographies of this sort do exist (e.g., Saul's conversion to Paul). But conversions of this magnitude are atypical and rare. Most of us go along with the god of our culture and/or family. Few Christians ponder how resistant they are to Muslim evangelism to note how it would be the same if the shoe were on the other foot.

In short, should I get "credit" for being a Christian? Or am I merely lucky?

What about that flat tire?

All this is to say that I was very pleased to see Rob Bell raising the issue of moral luck at the start of Love Wins. As I said, I think moral luck is one of the two biggest stumbling blocks to faith. And as best I can tell, few young people feel that they are getting honest, direct, and substantive answers to their questions on this issue. I've seen very little popular (or academic for that matter) engagement with this issue. That's a problem. You have this huge stumbling block to faith with every little by way of recognition, engagement and response. No wonder young people are getting fed up with church.

Of course, if you're a regular reader here, you know I've cobbled together my answer to the question of moral luck. Not saying I'm right, but at least I recognize the problem and have struggled to find something substantive to say on the subject. I think it's time for the church to catch up. And for that, I appreciate Love Wins for pushing the question.

Toward a Post-Cartesian Theology, Part 5: A Political Warmup

Before I turn to theological issues in the post-Cartesian situation, I want to think about volitional models in political theories. I'm calling this post a "warmup" as this political discussion sets up some ideas for later theological discussions.

Grand political systems (as in theological systems) require some vision as to the nature and capacities of human persons. Whether the system is socialistic, democratic, Marxist, or whatever a grand political theory must start with a vision of man. Once "man" is specified, much of the theory follows.

One of the capacities of man that must be specified is his volitional capacity. How radically autonomous or free is man? Using my labels, do weak volitional or strong volitional models describe man? Do we possess characterological inertia? Or can we, volitionally speaking, turn on a dime?

Let's see how the weak versus strong volitional models help make sense of the two political systems dominating the American political scene: Democrats and Republicans.

In strong volitional models, people, due to their radical autonomy, can be morally praised or blamed for the outcomes of their choices. If success in life is simply a matter of making good choices, of sucking it up and "taking responsibility," than there is no one to blame but yourself for your situation in life. In America, where free markets set up meritocracies, strong volitional models cause us to moralize the poor and the rich. That is, if we are radically autonomous, those successful in life have excellent character: they are industrious, "take responsibility," and make healthy choices. They are good. Conversely, if you are failing to move up the American meritocracy, then you have only yourself to blame. You are either lazy or immoral. You are bad. In short, in America at least, strong volitional models lead to the moralization the rich and the poor.

This moralization affects issues such as tax cuts and the welfare state. Taxes, as we all know, are a means to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. However, given the logic of strong volitional models, taxes are immoral. Why should you take money from the good and the virtuous to support the lazy and immoral? Isn't this robbing from the good and giving to the bad? Did not the good earn their money through hard and honest labor? If so, let them keep their money. They earned it.

Weak volitional models see this situation completely differently. If will is contingent, then the fortunes of birth and circumstance will have huge impacts upon our character. Thus, although this is not to rob us of the truth that hard work pays off, our situation in life is impacted by fortune. Will, virtue, and hard work are not the only factors in play. If the person is a contingent agent, will, virtue, and work ethic, those engines of meritocratic ascent, are affected by circumstance. Luck is in play.

If luck is in play, we can't moralize the rich and the poor. The poor are not immoral, they are less fortunate. Unlucky. Conversely, the rich are not always good. But many are lucky. In short, when evaluating the rich and poor we must pause and factor moral luck into the equation. The drug dealer may not be the evil person we think he is. If raised in different circumstances and with different genes (i.e., if you have the genes to be a rocket science luck has helped you; I won't ever be a rocket scientist no matter how hard I work) you don't end up as a drug dealer. Maybe you get Neil Armstrong.

To summarize the weak volitional perspective, here's Spinoza: "And because [we] think ourselves free, those notions have arisen: praise and blame. sin and merit." Thus, if we are less than radically free, then moral luck attenuates strong volitional notions of praise, merit, blame, and, yes, even sin.

If we approach taxes and wealth redistribution from a weak volitional perspective we get the exact opposite view from the strong volitionalist. If weak volitionism holds, taxes are not immoral; they are exceedingly moral. That is, if the rich are rich and the poor are poor due, in some part, to luck, then it makes plenty of sense to redistribute to achieve some fairness. The rich don't get to keep it all because, in a weak volitional world, they didn't earn all they have. They might have earned some or even a large part of what they own, but luck helped as well. And it's unfair to benefit from luck at the expense of others. So, it makes sense, moral sense, to tax.

Here's the interesting thing. Views of person have consequences. Big consequences! An important issue like taxes is seen as either moral or immoral due to the answer to one simple question: What are the volitional capacities of humans? If they are vast, then taxes are immoral. If they are circumscribed, then moral.

Thus, embedded deep within the Republican and Democratic worldviews is a View of Person. And the rest, they say, is history.

My point: What goes for political models goes for theological models as well.

The Gospel According to The Lord of the Rings: Week 43, Saved By Grace or Luck?

Before turning our attention back to Frodo and Sam in Book 4, one last note about the "deep narrative" of the story appearing with the Company.

After the fall of Isengard, Gandalf takes with him the palantĆ­r, the round crystal ball Saruman was using to communicate with Sauron.

For some reason, the palantĆ­r holds an allure for Pippin, who is drawn to it in way that serves as an allegory of desire and sin. In the night, Pippin steals the palantĆ­r from Gandalf and looks into it.

Looking into the palantĆ­r Pippin comes face to face with Sauron, who questions him. Pippin cries out and awakens Gandalf.

Upon learning what Pippin has done Gandalf examines Pippin and finds that no damage has been done to him. Relieved, he shares this with Pippin:

But mark this! You have been saved, and all your friends too, mainly by good fortune, as it is called.

Is Pippin saved by grace or by luck? Gandalf seems to hint that what we call luck might actually be grace. We could be misdescribing our lives. There's a joke I've been telling for years. When something fortuitous happens, I'll say, "We were lucky, or it was providential, depending upon your metaphysic."

Not a real knee slapper of a joke. But it illustrates Gandalf's point. Is your life a story of grace or luck? Is someone watching out for us or is it all just random chance? It reminds me of M. Night Shyamalan's movie Signs. In the movie you may recall Mel Gibson's character is a priest struggling with faith, and at the start of the movie he shares this:

People break down into two groups. When they experience something lucky, group number one sees it as more than luck, more than coincidence. They see it as a sign, evidence, that there is someone up there, watching out for them. Group number two sees it as just pure luck. Just a happy turn of chance...deep down, they feel that whatever happens, they're on their own. And that fills them with fear. Yeah, there are those people. But there's a whole lot of people in group number one...they're looking at a miracle. And deep down, they feel that whatever's going to happen, there will be someone there to help them. And that fills them with hope. See what you have to ask yourself is what kind of person are you? Are you the kind that sees signs, that sees miracles? Or do you believe that people just get lucky?

Why I am a Universalist, Part 5: Salvation in a Post-Cartesian World


This post carries over from my post on Moral Luck. I want to talk specifically about free will systems of soteriology (e.g., Arminianism) and the crisis they will face in the coming years.

The philosopher Thomas Nagel in his essay "Moral Luck" correctly notes a connection between moral luck, free will, and responsibility. Perhaps you also sensed the connection when you read that post. Specifically, contemplation of moral luck tends to shrink the scope of human agency. Further contemplation can shrink agency to the point where it goes "poof!" Gone.

So this post will consider a kind of worst case scenario for human agency and free will: What if free will becomes wholly untenable to future generations of Christians? How will soteriology have to cope with that possible theological future?

But is that future possible? Will free will really undergo a theological crisis? I'll argue that, yes, the crisis is coming and is already starting.

Where is the crisis coming from? Simply, it is due to the demise of Cartesian dualism.

As most are aware, the belief that we are comprised of both body and soul is referred to as Cartesian dualism, or simply dualism. The name is due to Rene Descartes who was the pivotal Western thinker who articulated the idea in the Western philosophical literature. For those dismissive of Cartesian dualism the idea is called "the Ghost in the machine."

As Descartes paints the Ghost in the Machine model our soul inhabits our body or at least interfaces with it and, thus, via that interface mechanism, directs the actions of the body. But this model creates a whole other round of issues known as the "mind-body problem." How exactly does the soul (typically aligned with the mind/consciousness) interface with the body? And how does the body interface with the soul? These kinds of considerations have generated such a large speculative literature that it defies my ability to summarize it all.

But I don't think we need to dwell on the mechanics of dualism because dualism is growingly untenable. Modern people are increasingly refusing to believe that they have a soul inhabiting their body. There is no Ghost. Why is this assessment growing in the population? Answer: Neuroscience.

To illustrate these popular trends, trends that will grow over time, below I walk through two different newspaper editorials in the mainstream media by two very influential psychologists.

In a New York Times September 10, 2004 piece, entitled “The Duel Between Body and Soul,” the psychologist Paul Bloom stated that:

The great conflict between science and religion in the last century was over evolutionary biology. In this century, it will be over psychology, and the stakes are nothing less than our souls.

Why does Bloom draw this conclusion? He explains that science is gradually making the idea of the soul untenable:

The qualities of mental life that we associate with souls are purely corporeal; they emerge from biochemical processes in the brain. This is starkly demonstrated in cases in which damage to the brain wipes out capacities as central to our humanity as memory, self-control and decision-making.

According to Bloom, this conclusion, that the soul is nothing more than the brain, is creating enormous tension between the religious and the scientific view of man:

The conclusion that our souls are flesh is profoundly troubling to many, as it clashes with the notion that the soul survives the death of the body. It is a much harder pill to swallow than evolution, then, and might be impossible to reconcile with many religious views. Pope John Paul II was clear about this, conceding our bodies may have evolved, but that theories which ‘consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are incompatible with the truth about man.’ This clash is not going to be easily resolved.

We find similar sentiments expressed by author and Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker his September 27, 2004 Newsweek article entitled “How to Think About the Mind: Neuroscience shows that the ‘soul’ is the activity of the brain”:

Every evening our eyes tell us that the sun sets, while we know that, in fact, the Earth is turning us away from it. Astronomy taught us centuries ago that common sense is not a reliable guide to reality. Today it is neuroscience that is forcing us to readjust our intuitions. People naturally believe in the Ghost in the Machine: that we have bodies made of matter and spirits made of an ethereal something. Yes, people acknowledge that the brain is involved in mental life. But they still think of it as a pocket PC for the soul, managing information at the behest of a ghostly user.

Modern neuroscience has shown that there is no user. ‘The soul’ is, in fact, the information-processing activity of the brain. New imaging techniques have tied every thought and emotion to neural activity.


Pinker, like Bloom, also recognizes the lurking conflict with religion that this view of the brain entails:

In Galileo's time, the counter-intuitive discovery that the Earth moved around the sun was laden with moral danger. Now it seems obvious that the motion of rock and gas in space has nothing to do with right and wrong. Yet to many people, the discovery that the soul is the activity of the brain is just as fraught, with pernicious implications for everything from criminal responsibility to our image of ourselves as a species. Turning back the clock on the ultimate form of self-knowledge is neither possible nor desirable. We can live with the new challenges from brain science. But it will require setting aside childlike intuitions and traditional dogmas, and thinking afresh about what makes people better off and worse off.

Here is why I am citing these two articles:

1. This is the growing view in the modern world. Neuroscience is making Cartesian dualism untenable. In short, in the coming decades Christian reference to the "soul" will seem quaint and charming. Like speaking about the tooth fairy or Santa Claus.

2. We are currently training ministers to go out into a post-modern and post-Christian world. Well, that's great. But let me make clear a challenge that bible professors are wholly overlooking. We are sending ministers out into a POST-CARTESIAN world. And, I ask, are these ministers being prepared for THAT? How quaint that we are training people to go out to reason in the world with notions as charming, to the listeners, as the Easter bunny.

3. Neuroscience, like evolution before it, is setting up up for a titanic struggle between faith and reason. And this one will be much, much worse. The soul itself is at stake. But what if Christianity looses this battle as it has with evolution? What if the soul is removed as a legitimate category of discourse? How will theology need to adjust?

In fact, theology HAS begun to adjust. Embodied visions of humans which reject the Platonic influences inherent in Cartesian dualism are on the rise. See the work of Nancy Murphy as a case in point (start with her book Bodies and Souls or Spirited Bodies?).

Although I applaud the work of Murphy, I don't, however, think she or others are really facing up to the real crisis. The real crisis isn't about the soul. The real crisis is about free will.

The doctrine of the soul is only important in that it allows a mechanism for free will. For what other reason would we care if the soul existed or not? If I have no soul why should I care? Immortality isn't really an issue, because the vision in the bible is of a bodily resurrection. No, the fear of not having a soul isn't about immortality, it's about free will and moral accountability.

For the soul is believed to allow us causal powers outside of the scope of environment, heredity, and moral luck. But if there is no soul, as Nagel points out, human agency reduces until, poof!, it's gone. Again, the crisis isn't really about the soul. The crisis is about free will.

So, as a psychologist, let me tell you about the theological landscape of the future:

It will be a world where the soul has no place. In its place will be behavioral genetics, neuroscience, and psychology. "Sins" will be increasingly be viewed as biological or environmental issues (e.g., addictions, chemical imbalances). And, as a consequence, issues of justice, crime and punishment will continue to move more toward rehabilitative and social contract (e.g., deterrence) models. In short, the brain with its related sciences will slowly transform notions of free will and in its wake notions of virtue, sin, justice, crime, and punishment. Humans will be viewed as the product, a nexus, of causal activity and we will strive, as a self-reflective species, to understand and manipulate that causal machinery to engineer a harmonious future for all. We are in the beginning stages of this process, you see it already around you, and it will intensify as Pinker and Bloom say it will.

And as this future evolves, how will Arminian soteriological systems fare?

Not well.

How will universalism fare?

Very, very well.

Why? Because as notions of "free will" erode we will have to alter notions of moral praise and blame. Moral luck will dominate discussions of human responsibility. And Arminian systems will have no leverage in these conversations. But universalism will. Because universalism is fully compatible with a causal vision of the will. That is, God is fully willing and able (from a time perspective) to work with you as causal nexus, working with and shaping your contingent will to mold you into the image of Jesus.

Universalism is on the rise. And the factor driving this trend is, interestingly, neuroscience.

Universalism: A Summary Defense

Early in the history of this blog I posted my reasons for subscribing to universalism. Lately I've wanted to pull those arguments into a summary post. Here, then, are the reasons I believe in universal reconciliation, the eventual redemption of all of humanity.

1. Talbott's Propositions (along with a discussion of moral luck and human volition)
The philosopher Thomas Talbott has us consider the following three propositions:

  1. God’s redemptive love extends to all human sinners equally in the sense that he sincerely wills or desires the redemption of each one of them.
  2. Because no one can finally defeat God’s redemptive love or resist it forever, God will triumph in the end and successfully accomplish the redemption of everyone whose redemption he sincerely wills or desires.
  3. Some human sinners will never be redeemed but will instead be separated from God forever.
All three propositions have ample biblical support. But, as Talbott points out, you cannot, logically, endorse all three. Talbott goes on to show how the various soteriological systems adopt two of the propositions and reject/marginalize the third. Summarizing how this happens:
  1. Calvinism/Augustinianism: Adopt #2 and #3. God will accomplish his plans and some will be separated from God forever. This implies a rejection of #1, that God wills to save all humanity. This conclusion is captured in the doctrine of election and double predestination (i.e., God predestines some to be saved and some to be lost).
  2. Arminianism: Adopt #1 and #3. God loves all people and some people will be separated from God forever. This implies that God's desires--for example, to save everyone--can be thwarted and unfulfilled. This is usually explained by an appeal to human choice. Due to free will people can resist/reject God. Thus, where a Calvinist puts the "blame" on God for someone going to hell (election) Arminians place the blame on people (free will).
  3. Universalism: Adopt #1 and #2. God loves all people and will accomplish his purposes. This implies a rejection of #3. The implication is that God will continue his salvific work in some postmortem fashion. Note that this postmortem salvific work can, and often does, involve a strong vision of hell and can be Christocentric.
I reject Calvinism because I find the doctrine of election to be loathsome. I don't find God worthy of worship, praise or service if he created people with the intention of torturing most of them forever. True, such actions would demonstrate his sovereignty and "justice" but it is hard to see those actions as loving and praise-worthy. Also, I don't see how Calvinism allows for a dynamic and interactive relationship between God and humanity. We end up being mere puppets and playthings.

To be fair, the reason Calvinism and Reformed theology leaves me cold is largely biographical. I grew up in an Arminian tradition. Since college, however, I've grown disillusioned with free will soteriological and theodicy systems. For three interrelated reasons:
  1. Moral Luck: We begin life in very different places, morally and religiously. Some people get a head start on Christianity. Others are raised in different religious traditions. Further, our life journeys can be highly variable, religiously and morally. A child might be abused by a church leader. A missionary might never show up at your village.
  2. The Timing of Death is Unpredictable: The death event is arbitrary in its timing. Some people live to a ripe old age and get to repent of past sins or find the time to explore Christianity (if they were born into another religion). Other people die young and never get the chance, through no fault of their own, to repent or explore Christianity.
  3. Free Will is a Non-Starter: As a psychologist I've come to believe that human volition (will) is very circumscribed and anemic in its powers. Humans have the capacity for choice, and perhaps freedom within a certain range, but at the end of the day human choice is finite and limited. It can only do so much.
Given that our moral and religious journeys are qualitatively different (e.g., moral luck: some people get head starts), that death is random (which can arbitrarily lengthen or shorten your religious and moral journey) and a realistic view of human volitional powers (there is no radical form of free will) it was difficult for me to maintain the Arminian stance of my religious heritage.

So, having rejected both Reformed and Arminian thinking I've settled on universalism as the soteriological and eschatological system that best describes my views on salvation and redemption.

2. A Morally Coherent View of Justice
Most defenders of a classical view of hell eventually make appeals to God's justice. However, for justice to be justice it has to meet a few, almost axiomatic, standards. Most importantly, all notions of justice involve proportionality. As they say, the punishment must fit the crime. Thus, a punishment of infinite duration and unspeakable torment fails to meet any moral standard of justice. More, if we want to link justice to love then there needs to be a rehabilitative facet to the punishment. Not all justice is rehabilitative. Capital punishment isn't. But a loving justice will try to accomplish three things:
  1. Vengeance for Victims (Justice)
  2. Rehabilitation of the Perpetrators (Grace)
  3. The Reconciliation of Perpetrators and Victims (Forgiveness and Repentance)
Of the major soteriological systems only universalism gets us all three of these things.

3. Missional Concerns Over the Soteriological/Eschatological Disjoint
Many people in the church see salvation as a binary, you are either saved or lost. Christians then fetishize this status, obsessing over who, at Judgment Day, will be saved or lost. This causes the Christian community to become otherworldly in its focus, ignoring the cosmic (e.g., social, political, ecological) and developmental (i.e., sanctification) aspects of salvation. This becomes a missional problem in the church, where people just look to "get saved," eschatologically speaking. But it is hard to fault people for this fetish if they are seeing things correctly, that there will be a non-reversible binary judgement at the end of all things. In short, as much as missional church leaders want to instill the notion that salvation is this-worldly as well as other-worldly they will fail, for clear psychological reasons, unless they undermine the classic doctrine of hell. Leave the classical teaching of hell intact (overtly or by trying to ignore it) and you'll compromise your missional effort. Like it or not, hell and mission are intimately related. Worries over hell (which can't be helped if you leave the doctrine intact) will import otherworldliness into the mission of the church.

4. Regulating Passages
The biggest objection to universalism involves the passages regarding hell in the bible. However, there is no doctrinal teaching that doesn't have contradictory tensions within the biblical witness. Witness the hermeneutical and exegetical diversity within the Christian tradition. In short, universalists are not in any unique position. This is the way it is with just about any doctrine.

The issue, then, ultimately boils down to which biblical texts will regulate doctrinal choices. For example, which of the two passages regulates your doctrine regarding female leadership in the church?
  1. "I do not permit a woman to teach, nor have authority over a man." (1 Timothy 2.12)
  2. "There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus." (Galatians 3.28)
If you are a Complementarian Passage #1 regulates your understanding of Passage #2. If you are an Egalitarian Passage #2 regulates how you understand Passage #1. And there is no way to resolve any debate between the two camps as these are meta-biblical choices.

A similar thing holds for the soteriological debates. Universalists have regulating passages that frame how they understand the texts about hell. Here are four regulating texts for universalists:
  1. "God is love." (1 John 4.8)
  2. "For God was pleased to have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross." (Colossians 1.19-20)
  3. "When he has done this, then the Son himself will be made subject to him who put everything under him, so that God may be all in all." (1 Corinthians 15.28)
  4. "For God has bound all men over to disobedience so that he may have mercy on them all." (Romans 11.32)
As with the gender texts one has to choose regulating texts about hell. And these are meta-biblical choices. People who believe in a classical vision of hell will read the four passages above through that lens. Universalists, by contrast, will read the texts on hell through the lens of these four passages. That is, they will teach that hell must:
  1. Be a manifestation that "God is love."
  2. Be a means to "reconcile all things" to God
  3. Allow God to be "all in all"
  4. Provide a way for God to "have mercy upon all"
5. Hope
I think it was Karl Barth who said that he couldn't be sure if universalism was true but that it was every Christian's obligation to hope so.

The Gospel According to The Lord of the Rings: Week 2, "Something Else at Work"

It might seem strange to hear Fleming Rutledge say that The Lord of the Rings is a book about God. Because on the surface at least, Middle Earth is godless and irreligious. The world isn't Christian, but neither is it pagan. There are no references to deities. There is no worship, no religious rites, rituals, or sacrifices. No prayers or petitions to God or gods.

To be sure, the metaphysics of Middle earth are explored in The Silmarillion. But the drama of The Lord of the Rings takes place largely within a metaphysical vacuum. And that vacuum, says Rutledge, creates a blank canvas upon which we might detect the actions of God.

One way to see this, for Rutledge, is to contrast the metaphysics of The Hobbit with The Lord of the Rings. And it's a good place to start this series as The Hobbit functions as the prequel to The Lord of the Rings.

Two things strike you about the metaphysics of The Hobbit in contrast to The Lord of the Rings. I'll talk about the first contrast this week and the second contrast next week.

The first contrast is the emphasis on chance and luck in The Hobbit in contrast to The Lord of the Rings. Consider how Bilbo finds the Ring in The Hobbit. He's crawling around in the dark and by chance puts his hand on top of the Ring. Nothing more is said about this discovery from a metaphysical perspective. Thus, the reader is lead to believe that this discovery is simply good fortune, a lucky break. A significant bit of fortune, no doubt, but a chance happening nonetheless. And we find similar examples of Bilbo's good fortune and luck throughout his adventures in The Hobbit.

But a metaphysical change occurs in the Lord of the Rings. Fortune and luck give way to a guiding providence. Rutledge highlights this change in the first chapter of The Lord of the Rings "The Shadow of the Past" when Gandalf is sharing with Frodo the history of the Ring and Bilbo's discovery of it:
"There was more than one power at work, Frodo. The Ring was trying to get back to its master...It abandoned Gollum. Only to be picked up by the most unlikely person imaginable: Bilbo from the Shire!

"Behind that there was something else at work, beyond any design of the Ring-maker [the Dark Lord, Sauron]. I can put it no plainer than by saying that Bilbo was meant to find the Ring, and not by its maker. In which case you were also meant to have it."
The emphases are in the original. Bilbo was meant to find the Ring, and Frodo was meant to have it. But how and why? Because, as Gandalf says, there was "something else at work," a mysterious, unnamed Power in the background working to thwart the power of Evil.

This reference to a background Power working to thwart Evil can be highlighted because of the metaphysical vacuum in The Lord of the Rings. We can see this Power at work because the heavens are empty in The Lord of the Rings. If the supernatural realm was busy and buzzing in The Lord of the Ring we'd miss the subtle acts--the still, small voice--of this background Power.

The "story about God" Rutledge finds in The Lord of the Rings is the drama of the providential working of this background Power. She calls it the "deep narrative" of The Lord of the Rings, and it provides a stark theological contrast with The Hobbit.

In The Hobbit, Bilbo finds the Ring by chance.

In The Lord of the Rings, Bilbo was meant to find it.

The Cartesian Race

I just presented at the Graduate Student Association forum at ACU held every spring. This year it was on pSin and pSychology and focused on how psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral genetics are affecting notions of sin and moral responsibility. Well, if you are a regular reader you know that this topic is right up my alley.

Anyway, I had 13 minutes to give my spiel on the post-Cartesion situation (i.e., the demise of body/soul dualism) and weak volitionalism (i.e., a more humble view of human agency).

In the middle of my talk I wanted to explain and illustrate how weak-volitionalism and thanatocentrism (i.e., your moral "status" is fixed/determined at the moment of death) affect free will soteriological systems. How can you illustrate all this in about five minutes in a memorable way? Well, I invented what I called The Cartesian Race.

Here is the first slide of the Cartesian Race:


Here in Slide 1 we see a classic depiction of free will soteriological systems:

1. We possess "souls" that are disconnected from the causal influences of body and environment. This is depicted in our three ghosts.

2. Given that our soul is disconnected from our body/environment, we are ALL volitionally CAPABLE to respond to the Christian message. Thus, the moral race (which ends at death) is FAIR. This is symbolized by the souls/ghosts having the same starting line.

3. Given that the race is fair, your moral status at the time of death determines your eternal destination.

Okay, if you read this blog regularly you know I don't think the race is fair. One big reason is Moral Luck. That is, our "moral status" is hugely affected by contingent circumstance. So, to represent this visually I presented Slide 2, a modified version of the Cartesian Race but now incorporating Moral Luck:


Two observations about this slide:

1. We see that Moral Luck means that we all have different "starting lines" that provide advantage or disadvantage in the Race. For example, you might be born to loving, Christian parents in America. Or, you might have been born to loving Islamic parents in Iran. If "accepting Jesus as Savior" is central to Christian soteriological systems, these two children start off in very different locations. This is symbolized as the different "starting lines" for the ghosts/souls.

2. But another way to read this slide to is to note that this is a race that ends at death. And, given that death itself is a largely contingent event (e.g., some people die in random accidents), our mortal lives can be contingently extended or truncated. That is, in thanatocentric systems, the death event ends the race no matter how long or how little you've been running. This arbitrariness is also symbolized in the varying distances of the "race" each ghost/soul will run.

But there is more. As we run the race we each carry varying volitional loads. That is, responding to Christ will vary in effort depending upon a host of contingent factors that create a volitional burden you must carry to "cross the finish line" in good moral standing. For example, one child is raised by loving Christian parents and had an amazing church experience growing up. This person's volitional load is very "light." That is, responding to Christ is very "easy," volitionally speaking, for this person. But imagine another person who had a preacher for a father and this father sexually abused him/her. Further, the church he/she experienced was hypocritical and hateful. This person has a "heavy" volitional load. That is, responding to Christ is going to be much harder (if not impossible) for this person.

If we add volitional load to the Cartesian Race we get a very unfair event depicted in Slide 3:


That is, we have the following:

1. Different starting places in life.

2. Varying volitional loads.

3. And random race lengths due to the arbitrariness of the death event.

If you compare Slide 1 and this final slide you see, in a visual way, my concerns with free will soteriological systems. I just don't think they are coherent. I think the Cartesian Race is very unfair.

This brought me to my conclusion slide:


As can be seen in this slide, based on my assessment of the Cartesian Race, I call for a post-Cartesian soteriology (a "neuro-orthodoxy," which plays off the term "neo-orthodoxy"). I claim that a post-Cartesian soteriology must incorporate the following premise:

Many (if not most) humans do not possess the volitional capacity to accept Christ during their mortal lives.

I don't know where theology will go in the future, but if it doesn't factor in this conclusion I can't, as a psychologist, find it intellectually coherent or respectable. The Cartesian Race is simply unfair.

On Luck

We're in the middle of some family vacationing and today my son Aidan (aged 9) bought a necklace with a turtle on it at a gift shop (Aidan loves reptiles). All afternoon Aidan kept insisting that his turtle was "good luck." And, wouldn't you know it, after Aidan bought his necklace good things started happening. We caught buses when we needed them. Waiting lines were shorter. And, at the end of the day, we saw the prettiest rainbow we've ever seen.

So walking back to the hotel Aidan and I have this conversation:

Aidan: "My turtle necklace worked, didn't it? It brought us good luck, right?"
Me: "Well, metaphysically no. But psychologically, yes."
Aidan: "What does that mean?"
Me: "It means it worked."

Pascal's PensƩes: Week 17, At Home in the Universe?

201.

The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread.

///

Here we have one of Pascal's most famous lines.

Are we at home in the universe? Or are we an accident?

Many non-theists turn to life in the cosmos to instill and inspire wonder and awe, the surest materialistic route to something akin to religious transcendence. Carl Sagan was famous for making this move. Given the long cosmic odds, and all the necessary fine-tuning of the physical constants of the universe, it's really quite remarkable, even miraculous, that we find ourselves existing on this Pale Blue Dot. 

And as I point out in Hunting Magic Eels, these facts about our existence, and the energy of its attendant wonder, can be leveraged into a moral response, a materialistic warrant for loving and caring for life and the world we inhabit. Life is so very precious and rare, we must cherish and care for it.

Amen. But as I go on to point out in Hunting Magic Eels, and as Pascal points out above, our winning the cosmic lottery can cut both ways. There's a difference between feeling grateful versus feeling lucky. A difference between feeling at home in the universe and feeling liked you dodged a cosmic bullet to the head. As the scientists remind us, we're all quite fortunate and lucky to be here. But feeling lucky for life is different from feeling grateful. Gratitude is a social emotion, the response we feel when we've been given a gift. And where there is a gift, there is a gift-giver. As I say in the book, you can't feel grateful for life and creation and be an atheist, not emotionally. Being awed at the cosmic odds is different from saying "Thank you."

As I describe in Hunting Magic Eels, the psychological and existential difference between luck and grace (grace is the same word as gift in the New Testament) is illustrated in how feeling lucky, while able to be leveraged positively, also has the nagging and chronic vulnerability of slipping into despair and nihilism. This is Pascal's point. Feeling lucky is not too far from feeling like an accident, even a mistake, that the universe didn't want us, need us, and, regardless, will soon be rid of us. As the great atheist Jean-Paul Sartre put it, "Every existing thing is born without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance." Suck on that Carl Sagan.

Experiencing your life and creation as a gift, however, protects us from this nihilistic pit. Life is more than luck. You were meant to be here. Life is a gift. Existence is graced. A grace that provides a sturdier platform for both mental health and love than chance and cosmic rolls of the dice.

So look around, in wonder and awe, and say, "Thank you."

The Lost Art of the Church Potluck

My favorite memories of growing up in a small church are of the church potlucks. And that church still puts on awesome potlucks.

I expect that many of you have similar fond memories of church potlucks. Jana does. This last Sunday I was guest speaking at the East Side Church of Christ in Snyder. Jana was weighing if she wanted to go with me. Jana is a high school drama teacher and she was tired because her show just wrapped up and we'd gotten to bed late after striking the set.

I told Jana that after the service there would be a potluck.

"I think I'll come," Jana said, "there might be banana pudding."

And there was!

I don't know if it's a regional thing, but banana pudding is a staple of potlucks in Texas churches. And it's one of the best things you'll ever eat.

And yet, while it breaks my heart to say this, I think the art of the church potluck is on the decline.

We recently had a discussion about this with some friends at church, that potlucks are happening less frequently and, when they do happen, they aren't done very well. A symptom of a potluck gone bad at our church is when the potluck has to be supplemented by Little Caesar's pizza.

So I have to ask, is the Golden Age of the Church Pot Luck over?

It seems so.

With our friends we floated two hypotheses about the decline of the potluck.

The first was church size. It seems that churches are either very big or very small, making it harder to achieve the sweet spot for a congregation-wide potluck.

Our other hypothesis was about a loss of generational skill. The consensus was that our mothers and grandmothers really knew how to do a potluck. And the main thing was that they brought to the potluck a ton of food, enough for their family and many, many more.

And that, we all know, is the secret to having a good potluck. You have to have a critical mass of people bringing more food than they or their families will eat. A lot more food. And our mothers and grandmothers had go-to pot luck dishes to help produce this abundance.

But today the exact opposite happens. When people under forty go to a potluck most everyone brings a small side dish, not even enough for their family. And you don't have to be a resource allocation guru to know that if most people bring less than what they themselves will eat then that potluck is doomed. But more and more often that's what happening with church potlucks, people bring less than what they will consume.

It seems like an entire generation has forgotten the Golden Rule of the church potluck: Bring more that what you will eat. A lot more.

Because it's that excess and abundance that makes the hospitality of a potuck possible, allowing the spontaneous invitation to the visitor who comes empty-handed to be an experience of gift and grace.

Free Will, Causality, Character, and Moral Accountability: Part 2


“If a ‘free’ act be a sheer novelty, that comes not from me, the previous me, but ex nihilo, and simply tacks itself on to me, how can I, the previous I, be responsible? How can I have any permanent character that will stand still long enough for praise or blame to be awarded?”
-William James

“Since your majesty and your lordships desire a simple reply, I will answer without horns and without teeth. Unless I am convicted by scripture and plain reason--I do not accept the authority of popes and councils for they have contradicted each other--my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not recant anything, for to go against conscience is neither right nor safe. Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise.”
-Martin Luther during his trial at Worms (pictured here)

I want to mediate on Choice and Character in the church. In my comments to Pecs in the last post I said that I would like the church to begin making the following transitions:

Choice to Character
Rhetoric to Behavior Change
Trying to Training
Evangelism to Moral Formation
Missions to Social Justice
Moral Blame to Moral Luck

Let me elaborate on this list.

Choice to Character: I think the church makes mistakes when she is overly confident in her appeals to choice. The church should rather focus on the formation of character and the acquisition of virtue.

Rhetoric to Behavior Change: Elaborating further, character is not formed by persuasive rhetoric (i.e., a weekly appeal from the pulpit to be a good person). Rhetoric is excellent for changing opinions and, thus, an excellent tool for improving doctrine. But it is a poor tool for transforming the lives in the pew. That is, we are NOT volitionally nimble. We possess characterological inertia and causal forces will need to be brought to bear upon us to form us into the image of Christ. The word form (as in mold or shape) nicely captures the idea. We don't choose. We are formed.

Trying to Training: Thus, the focus of Kingdom living is less about "trying to be a better person" (via what William James called a "slow heave of the will") than about "training to be a better person." Church should be a kind of boot camp for Kingdom living.

Evangelism to Moral Formation: What I mean here is an evangelism that is volitionally-based, the traditional "Do you accept Jesus as your Lord and Savior? Yes or no?." The move should be to what Jesus asked for in the Great Commission: "Make disciples." Again, the word make gets at the idea very well.

Missions to Social Justice: These last two go together. Mission work should move away from "persuasion models" to actually changing the world. The question for missionaries should shift from "How many souls were saved?" to "How have you transformed that community into the Kingdom of God?"

Moral blame to Moral Luck: We shift from seeing the moral landscape as populated by the "righteous" and the "blameworthy" to seeing the "fortunate" and the "unfortunate." As Immanuel Kant said: “And how many there are who may have lead a long blameless life, who are only fortunate in have escaped so many temptations.”

If we make this shift, from strong volitional to weak volitional models, what gets lost? Actually very little. And the gains are enormous. By embracing causality and the contingent nature of will--by focusing on Character over Choice--the church might actually start being more effective (a nice causal word) in this world. We will rely less and less on God Talk and more and more on, well, actually doing things. You know, make a difference.

But what does get lost in this shift away from strong volitional models is a robust sense of moral blame or praise. In the contingent picture I paint you can't take credit for your good character and neither can we "blame" others for poor character. Yet much of Christian theology seems to hinge on notions of moral praise and blame. Particularly soteriological visions of Heaven and Hell.

But let's reflect on this a little. Do any of us really “take credit” for our character? I don’t. In my reflective moments I really just feel fortunate. I feel fortunate for my family, my wife, my opportunities, my friends, my church, and, ultimately, my God. I see myself as the product of a myriad of causal influences and I simply feel fortunate. Thomas Talbott, philosopher and theologian, in the book Universal Salvation?: The Current Debate, puts it this way:

“So how, then, do the [theologians of free will] explain the supposedly final division within the human race? Presumably by an appeal to human freedom: We ultimately determine our own destiny in heaven or hell. But if that is true, then the redeemed are also in a position to boast, it seems, along the following lines: ‘At the very least, some of my own free choices—my decision to accept Christ, for example—were a lot better than those of the lost, and these choices also explain, at least partially, why my character ended up to be a lot more virtuous than theirs.’

So the question I would put to [these thinkers] is this: Do you really believe that the differences between you and those who will supposedly be lost forever, or even between you and the world’s worst criminals, lies in the superior character of your own free choices? For my own part, I can find nothing either in myself or in the New Testament that would justify any such belief as that. I also find it revealing that few first person accounts of conversion sound anything like liberation free choices. To the contrary, a persistent theme in such accounts is how the Hound of Heaven gradually boxes someone in and closes off every alternative…God drags people to Christ by closing off their options and by undermining over time every conceivable motive for resistance. In that way God gradually restricts and then eliminates altogether one’s power to resist his grace…”


In sum, God gets us to a point where our character is formed like that of Martin Luther. Where we can stand for the Kingdom and the Cross and declare, not our freedom, but of a divine and blissful failure of freedom:

"Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise."

Toward a Post-Cartesian Theology, Part 1: Frankfurt on love, will, and normativity


I keep reflecting on issues concerning free will, moral agency, and soteriology. In my past posts on this subject I’ve offered critique more than offering something constructive. However, I’ve recently read a book that I think helped move my ideas in a more constructive direction.

First, for new readers, a recap of positions I’ve argued for in past posts. Consider these my Eight Theses, propositions you'll be exposed to if you read this blog regularly:

1. We are living in what I’ve called the post-Cartesian world. That is, with the rise of neuroscience and behavioral genetics, Cartesian dualism is growingly untenable.

2. A casualty in the post-Cartesian world is what I’ve called strong volitionalism. Strong volitionalism generally takes the form of “free will” or notions of “radical autonomy.”

3. Thus, in the post-Cartesian world weak volitional models will begin to predominate. Weak volitional models will have more anemic visions of human will, agency, and autonomy. The will is more contingent.

4. Given the contingent nature of the will, traditional notions of moral agency will need to be revised. Specifically, moral luck becomes an important issue that needs to be dealt with.

5. Moral luck will reconfigure notions of moral praise or blame with notions of moral fortune or misfortune.

6. These post-Cartesian adjustments will need to be accommodated by theological systems both systematically and practically.

7. Systematic theological considerations will need to focus on post-Cartesian views of the cross, salvation, afterlife, eternal reward/punishment, and theodicy.

8. Practical theological considerations will need to focus on post-Cartesian spiritual formation, social justice, missions, and evangelism.

Sprinkled throughout this blog are posts where I have (and many of you have) commented on issues #1-8. Sometimes we have discussed the post-Cartesian situation (e.g., are we really in it?). Sometimes we have debated free will vs. determinism. Sometimes we have wondered about salvation or evangelism in the post-Cartesian situation. Sometimes we have wondered about the implications of determinism for theodicy. And sometimes we’ve wondered about the specter of nihilism in the post-Cartesian world.

What has troubled me in my prior posts and comments on these topics is that I seem to do a lot of complaining. I’ve complained a lot about how theologians should more seriously consider the post-Cartesian situation of theology. However, complaining may be fine but it’s not very helpful. Yet, my own efforts at a constructive response to the post-Cartesian situation have been piecemeal and, thus, to me at least, unsatisfactory.

However, a recent book by Harry Frankfurt entitled Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right has suggested to me a path by which I could pull some of my ideas together into a more parsimonious package.

There are a few points that intrigue me about Frankfurt’s ideas. First, he is a weak volitionalist. Second, he has carved an interesting pathway through the thorny and tired “free will vs. determinism” debate. He doesn’t solve the debate, but he does allow for interesting conversations to proceed as that debate rumbles on. Third, Frankfurt links the will with love. And finally, Frankfurt links both the will and love with normativity (i.e., our ethical concerns). And it is this linkage between will, love, and morality—clearly a connection of deep interest to both psychologists and theologians—which is the key insight that I’d like to build on.

Basically, Frankfurt sees both love and the will as key facets of normativity. Thus, Frankfurt starts off this book with this:

…love is constituted by desires, intention, commitments, and the like. It is essentially—at least as I construe it—a volitional matter. In my view, then, the ultimate source of practical normative authority lies not in reason but in the will.
Clearly, love, will, and normativity are foundational concerns for theology. Thus, any attempt to link the three in a weak volitional manner must surely pique our interest, particularly in our post-Cartesian situation.

So, in the coming posts I’ll work through Frankfurt’s analysis with an eye on creating a post-Cartesian theology (practically and systematically).

Universal Reconciliation: Some Questions and Answers

As a part of the lively Internet discussion surrounding the publication of Rob Bell's Love Wins, I started a series of posts entitled "Musings about Universalism." There were ten essays in all, most of which were focused on a Frequently Asked Question about the doctrine of universal reconciliation. I'd like to gather all ten essays into one location so that I can archive the posts on my sidebar and allow others to link interested parties to this page rather than having readers dig through the blog archives.

As I expect this post to have a long shelf life, and to set the mood, readers who missed it might like to start with the provocative Love Wins video that stirred up so much discussion on the Internet prior to the publication of the book:

LOVE WINS. from Rob Bell on Vimeo.

One clarification about my language below. "Universalism" is a vague and broad term. When I use the word "universalism" I'm referring to the Christian doctrine that "all things" will be reconciled to God through Christ so that God will be "all in all" (Col. 1.19-20; 1 Cor. 15.28).

Question 1:
How did you end up adopting the doctrine of universal reconciliation? And how does that doctrine relate to the Arminian and Calvinistic approaches?

Answer: I grew up in an Arminian tradition, believing that it was God's will to save all humanity. I've never wavered in that belief. Eventually, however, due to problems I had with free will, moral luck, and the death-centered nature of Arminian theology, I adopted a Calvinist belief--a strong view of God's Sovereignty. Those two beliefs--it is God's will to save everyone and, as Rob Bell puts it, "God gets what God wants"--combined to create a sort of theological version of 1 + 1 = 2 leading me to the doctrine of universal reconciliation.

Central Tendency in Skewed Distributions: A Lesson in Social Justice

I think I'm one of the few academic bloggers in the world who blogs in a discipline that has nothing to do with what I teach at the university. Theology and this blog are my hobby. By profession I'm an experimental psychologist. Which means that my day job is largely about teaching undergraduate and graduate statistics for psychology students. That's what pays the rent.

In short, nothing I write about in this blog is a part of my daily classroom teaching. I've never taught a class in theology. I don't teach in our College of Biblical Studies. I have no contact with our MDiv students. In my entire career at ACU I've guest lectured in a graduate bible class exactly...once.

Basically, I'm living two lives.

But my interest in theology does, from time to time, leak into my statistics lectures. A recent example.

Earlier this semester in my undergraduate statistics class we were talking about measures of Central Tendency and how they behave in skewed frequency distributions. Let me explain this.

A measure of Central Tendency is a number helping you ballpark the "middle" or "center" of a distribution. The most commonly used estimate of Central Tendency is the mean, the arithmetic average. You calculate the mean by adding up all the scores and then dividing by the total number of scores.

The second most common measure of Central Tendency is the median. The median marks the 50th percentile. Fifty percent of the scores are above the median and fifty percent fall below the median.

When a distribution of scores is bell-shaped and balanced (a normal distribution) both the mean and the median sit in the exact center splitting the distribution right down the middle. That is, the mean and median are equal. See the center distribution in the picture below.

Well, if that's the case, if the mean and median have the same value, why have two different measures?

Because this only happens in perfectly symmetrical distributions. When the distribution is skewed and asymmetrical the mean and median take on different values. Which is to say when a distribution is unbalanced there's no consensus on where the "middle" might be located. You could say the middle is where the mean sits. Or you could say the middle is where the median sits.

Okay, so what issues might affect that choice? Well, the key thing to note is that the mean is the most sensitive to the effects of skew. That is, the mean is very sensitive to extreme scores and, thus, is "tugged" more rightward or leftward compared to the median. This can be seen in the left and right distributions of the picture below (Note: the Mode is a third measure of central tendency and is the most frequently occurring score, thus it always sits at the top/highest point of the distribution):

Note how in the left picture (an example of negative skew) the mean is the most leftward measure of central tendency. That is, the mean is the most affected by the extreme scores on the left and is, thus, pulled furthest away from where the scores are piling up to the right. A similar thing is observed in the right picture (an example of positive skew) where the mean has been tugged the furthest rightward.

What is the implication of all this? Basically the following. When a distribution is "normal" people usually report the mean. But when the distribution is skewed we tend to report the median as the median is less affected by the extreme scores.

So where does theology fit into this?

Well, as I was describing all this to my students a month ago I asked the following question:

"When you hear people report the average family income of American households do you hear people say 'mean family income' or 'median family income'?"

A few students respond, "I think I hear people say 'median family income'."

"That's right. The measure of Central Tendency we tend to use in reporting family income is the median. Okay, so what does that tell you about the distribution of family incomes?"

"That it's skewed?"

"Right. When you hear people using the median that's often a clue that the distribution they are trying to describe is skewed. And the distribution of family incomes in America is skewed."

I follow up with another question. "Can you guess if the distribution of American incomes is positively or negatively skewed?" (Refer to the picture above to make your own guess.)

"Is it positively skewed?"

"Yes, it's positively skewed. The great majority of American incomes pile up on the left, on the low end. But there are a few extreme scores--the millionaires and billionaires--that pull the distribution to the right."

I draw this distribution on the board. For you, here is the distribution of American family incomes based on 2005 data (H/T to Visualizing Economics):

Note the positive skew. Note also the behavior of the median and mean (you may need to click on the graph for a closer look). The median is $46,326. The mean is $64,344. Again, the mean is more affected by the presence of the extreme scores, being pulled more rightward by those millionaires and billionaires (who are actually so rightward they are literally off the chart).

Okay, again where is the theology in all this? Well, it has to do with issues related to social justice. I made this point in class a month ago in the following way:

"Note how American family incomes are all piled up on the left. What does that mean? What are the practical implications of that?

Think about it this way. What is the income that officially marks poverty? It's around $20,000. Okay, now imagine a solidly middle class person, someone who makes, say, $50,000.

Given that, what is the distance between the middle class and poverty? About $30,000. Is that a lot of money?

What if someone in the family has a catastrophic illness? Can the hospital bills from a catastrophic or chronic illness run over $30,000 in a year? Oh my yes. Hospital bills from illnesses like that can run in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.

And what about disability or injury to the breadwinner? Or divorce? Or layoffs?

Shoot, if your car breaks down you're screwed. Many new cars are well over $30,000. And a good used car can deplete that $30,000 buffer pretty quickly.

The point being, the lesson of the positive skew, is that the distance between being middle class and being poor is very, very small. We're all piled up on the left of the distribution. So a little bit of bad luck--illness, injury, layoffs, something going wrong with the house or car--and a solidly middle class family can fall below the poverty line. Can even become homeless. And if not that, can struggle mightily and will have to forgo things like sending their kids to college. A little bit of bad luck and a family might suffer generational consequences.

Now consider this. If the distance between the middle class and poverty is about $30,000 what is the distance between being middle class and, say, being Donald Trump or Bill Gates?

If the distance between middle class and poverty is $30,000 the distance between middle class and being a millionaire is $950,000. See the difference? There's not really a difference, a few thousand dollars, between the working poor and the middle class. We are all piled up, the great majority of Americans, on the left. And the difference between all those folks and the rich is, well, measured in the millions if not billions of dollars. It's a distance that is hard to compute in your mind.

In short, to be middle class is to live with chronic vulnerability and uncertainty. A real day to day anxiety about waiting for the other shoe to drop. Which is why access to things like universal health care and unemployment benefits are so important, a social safety net for those at or near the bottom. Which, the positive skew tells us, is basically everyone."

Stoicism and Christianity, Part 2: The Taoist Farmer

I'm going to post some more on stoicism to work through some of the questions many of you raised to my last post. Please note that these posts will be rumative as I don’t know where this line of thinking is going in my own mind. I’m working it out with you out loud.

All I want to do in this post is simply to note that when I refer to stoicism I’m focusing on this idea of apatheia, the ability to deal with circumstances with a degree of equanimity.

I think all the great wisdom traditions agree the apatheia is critical to human well-being and happiness. I’ve hinted at these themes in the Christian tradition and obviously the Greeks agreed. But notions of apatheia are also important to the Eastern traditions as well (e.g., Buddhism, Taoism).

My favorite example of apatheia comes from a Taoist parable, the parable of the farmer. I frequently tell this story to my students and it has become very important to me in my own life. Here it is as an example of the kind of attitude I’m speaking of in this series:

A farmer named Sei Weng owned a beautiful mare which was praised far and wide. One day this beautiful horse disappeared. The people of his village offered sympathy to Sei Weng for his great misfortune. Sei Weng said simply, "Who can say what is good or bad?"

A few days later the lost mare returned, followed by a beautiful wild stallion. The village congratulated Sei Weng for his good fortune. He said, "Who can say what is good or bad?"

Some time later, Sei Weng's only son, while breaking in the stallion, fell off and broke his leg. The village people once again expressed their sympathy at Sei Weng's misfortune. Sei Weng again said, "Who can say what is good or bad?"

Soon thereafter, war broke out and all the young men of the village except Sei Weng's lame son were drafted and were killed in battle. The village people were amazed as Sei Weng's good luck. His son was the only young man left alive in the village. But Sei Weng kept his same attitude: despite all the turmoil, gains and losses, he gave the same reply, "Who can say what is good or bad?"


What I like about this parable is that it highlights the futility of continually sorting our experiences as “good” or “bad.” True, some things might be seen as truly, objectively bad. But that would be to miss the grain of truth expressed in the parable. For my students, I tell them that the moral of the parable is this: Let’s let go of all the drama. A message which, you might guess, is timely for my emotionally volatile college students.

Basically, what I think is important in the stoical approach is a patience with circumstance rather than an evaluation of circumstance (leading to the view that happiness is obtained by changing circumstance). I think this patience and willingness to absorb life as it comes is critical to well-being. As such, it is a stance that is philosophically therapeutic.