Evil and Theodicy, Part 2: Can Happinees and Virtue Be Linked?

In my last post I outlined the basic scheme of Susan Neiman's Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Specifically, the problem of evil has to do with a disjoint. One way to frame that disjoint is the gap between virtue and happiness. We would like to think that virtue is causally and systematically associated with happiness. There are no guarantees of course, but we'd like to think that the pursuit of virtue wasn't a self-defeating task. But evil disrupts this hope. Evil appears to radically dislocate virtue and happiness. Innocent and good people often suffer horrificly while vile and hateful people flourish. Consequently, it would appear that, in the face of evil, virtue and happiness are not linked.

Given the appearance of evil many thinkers produce a theodicy, a way to show that despite appearances there are links between virtue and happiness. We might not be experiencing those links, but that is a failure. The links exist even if unrealized. That might not be much comfort, but it gives some assurance that the Cosmos is orderly and that suffering could, potentially, be overcome.

After presenting these formulations regarding evil and the goal of theodicy, Neiman goes on in Evil in Modern Thought to group thinkers into one of two camps (some thinkers can't be so grouped and these odd ducks are discussed separately in the book). The first camp of thinkers has contended that a theodicy was possible. That is, they felt reason could show the links between virtue and happiness. Some of these thinkers were theists (Leibniz) while others were not (Marx). Regardless, according to Neiman's scheme each felt that human flourishing was causally associated with human virtue.

In contrast to this first group is a group of thinkers who felt that a theodicy was impossible. The argument was that reason is impotent in the face of human suffering. Understanding the rhyme or reason of existence was impossible. These thinkers might differ on why theodicy fails, it may be due to the scope of reason or a flaw within it, but they agreed that the human experience stumps reason.

An interesting case study in this latter group is Neiman's take on the Marquis de Sade. You'll recall that the word sadism was coined to describe Sade's violent and depraved pornographic works. Interestingly, Sade considered himself to be a philosopher. His two major novels were Justine and Juliette. In these two novels Sade recounts the stories of two orphaned sisters who were separated at birth. Justine pursues a life of virtue but meets with nothing but misfortune, violence, and trauma. The subtitle of Justine is, appropriately, Good Conduct Well-Chastised. By contrast, Juliette pursues a life of vice and sadistic pleasures. And the more depraved Juliette behaves the more she flourishes, in wealth, power, body, and esteem. The subtitle of Juliette is Vice Amply Rewarded.

I've not read Sade's work, and from what Neiman describes I don't want to. I only bring up Neiman's take on Sade's novels because they make a point, albeit obscenely so, about the possibility of theodicy. Again, Neiman groups Sade with thinkers who felt no links could be drawn between virtue and happiness. The associations were not to be found. Sade's novels, violently and pornographically, were meant to show that virtue has no association with happiness.

Actually, it's a bit worse than that. For Neiman, Sade is helpful because he represents the nadir of theodicy. It's not that virtue and happiness are randomly and unpredictably associated. Rather, they go in opposite directions. And Sade follows those dark trajectories as far as one could go: The universe is antagonistic toward virtue and blesses vice.

Now I bet we've all, at some point, felt this way. Felt that the universe or God was sadistic. Actively seeking to punish goodness and innocence. I doubt we've sat in this place for long, but I know it's a common feeling. It is probably the most extreme form of lament there is.

Given all this, we can make a sketch as to the theodic options before us. I made this slide to illustrate:



This slide illustrates the tensions between the problem of evil and the aspirations of theodicy. The experience of evil moves us from left to right on the graph. It suggests that virtue and happiness are dislocated at best or inversely related at worst. Conversely, theodicy is an attempt to move us from right to left. An attempt to show that virtue can reliably produce happiness. True, these links are fragile and can be tragically reversed. But in a "normal" state of affairs the links exist. They may be like cobwebs, but still they shimmer.