In the last two posts I reviewed some of the intrinsic (theoretical) and systematic (textual) problems with Justification Theory discussed by Douglas Campbell in his book The Deliverance of God. In this post we will examine the empirical difficulties of Justification Theory wrapping up my summary of Part 1 of The Deliverance of God.

As a biblical and theological theory Justification Theory is not, generally speaking, a theory that can be falsified with historical or empirical data. For the most part, Justification Theory will stand or fall depending upon how well it explains the soteriology of Paul given what he wrote in his letters. However, Campbell notes two locations where Justification Theory makes contact with empirical reality making claims that can be assessed sociologically and historically. That is, there is some hard(er) data we might consider in assessing the viability of Justification Theory.

Empirical Claim #1: The Experience of Second Temple Judaism
As noted in earlier posts, Justification Theory--salvation by grace through faith--is seen as the solution to a problem that was inherent in Judaism. Specifically, Judaism is characterized by a "works-based righteousness." More, the Jews were legalists, struggling under a perfectionistic criterion. 100% Torah obedience was the mark of righteousness. This, according to Justification Theory, was a dead end, a trap, a moral impossibility. Given this situation, the gift of grace was a way out of the perfectionistic trap of legalism.

This characterization of the Jews made by Justification Theory is, at root, an empirical claim. It is a description of the theology and experience of Second Temple Judaism. So, it seems reasonable to ask, is this description accurate? Were the Jews struggling under a legalistic and perfectionistic system?

The short answer is no, they were not. The historical picture, filling in more every year, of Second Temple Judaism presents a picture at odds with the characterizations made by Justification Theory. A lot of this work has suggested that the Jews were not working with a legalistic model but were, rather, working within a covenantial model. More importantly for Campbell is what we have learned about the emotional experience of life in Second Temple Judaism. According to Justification Theory the Jews would have been in either one of two emotional states. First, an emotional despair at failing to live up to the perfectionistic criterion. Or, second, a (delusional) pride for being "blameless" under the Law. But there is little in the historical record to suggest that this is how the Jews experienced life under the Law or Covenant. Life during Second Temple Judaism was all over the place, with pockets of very different emotional experiences and performance expectations. No doubt there were Jews with tortured consciences (the Second Temple Jewish equivalent of Martin Luther) and Jews who were prideful hypocrites. But most Jews, well, were kind of like us. Trying to do good but with a somewhat realistic stance about what humans might achieve, morally speaking. Further, when the Jews experienced moral failure the Temple had its rituals of sacrifice and absolution, providing the Jews a regular means to handle their sin and disobedience. Jews went to the temple like Catholics go to confession. There was no hypocritical pride, no legalistic expectation, no angst at being damned. The Jewish soteriological system, in short, was working just fine, thank you very much. Thus, why would the Jews need to be rescued by the message of grace?

In short, Justification Theory, to make sense, needs to specify the theology and experience of Second Temple Judaism (i.e., they were tortured or prideful legalists). But, as we have seen, this specification is false. It's a straw man. In this sense, Justification Theory is an "answer" or a "gift" to a non-existent "question" or "trap." And if the trap never existed in the first place it's hard to see why Justification Theory is needed at all.

Empirical Claim #2: The Experience of Conversion
As noted in earlier posts, Justification Theory suggests that conversion occurs in a very particular way. Essentially it is a tortured, private, introverted, epistemological journey. You reach certain realizations that make your situation clear ("I am a sinner and stand condemned, justly, before God."). Having reached this place you accept, through faith, the offer of grace.

As Campbell points out, this view of conversion is an empirical prediction. Justification Theory makes the claim that, generally speaking, conversation will look a certain way. So the question becomes, does conversion in the real world look like the conversion described by Justification Theory?

The answer, unsurprisingly, is no, it does not. Few Christians are ever converted in this manner. Campbell reviews the sociological literature that suggests that conversion is more relational than intellectual. Although people might report spiritual journeys that seem to follow the path of Justification Theory, in empirical fact the "response" to the gospel occurs over time as a person becomes more and more affiliated with a particular faith community. That is, there is less a moment of moral crisis than a gradual identification with and participation in the life of a faith community. Conversion happens when we become more and more dislocated with the people on the "outside" and more and more affiliated with the people on the "inside." The final shift might be sudden and emotional, but the movement began well ahead of the final altar call.

The point of all this is that Justification Theory has a hard time explaining the inherently communal and participatory nature of real-life conversions. Few conversions look like the tortured inward journey posited by Justification Theory.

But it should be noted that the apocalyptic soteriology described in the last post does fit very well with how actual conversions work: The soteriological notion of ethical and liturgical participation in the life of a new, inherently communal, Kingdom. In short, there are readings of Paul that make more theological, textual and empirical sense than Justification Theory.