After yesterday's post about objective theories of the atonement, in light of my argument in The Book of Love that the cross is a theophany, I've continued thinking about how penal substitutionary atonement might be made compatible with classical theism.
In his book The Mosaic of Atonement, Joshua McNall describes, echoing C. S. Lewis, “mere penal substitution.” That is to say, like Christianity, where there are many different denominations that share a creedal core, there are many different ways of articulating penal substitution. But at the core of these theories, McNall identifies three basic features: (1) Christ acts and suffers in our place and instead of us; (2) Christ takes upon himself the penalty associated with human sin; and (3) the penalty has some form of divine sanction. In short, mere penal substitution has three key bits: (1) Substitution, (2) Penalty, and (3) Divine Sanction.
So, following McNall, what would these three aspects look like from the vantage point of classical theism and the cross-as-theophany?
First, substitution. On the surface, we could view the theophany of the cross as substitution. Christ brings a vision of judgment upon sin at the cross, and I do not. This seems substitutionary. That is to say, I am seeing something that is true about myself in Christ—his death on the cross—that I am not, myself, experiencing. A reality about me—God's judgment upon sin—is visible in Christ. This seems like “substitution.”
But the problem here is that substitution involves a counterfactual logic. Counterfactuals have an “if–then” structure: if something had not happened, then something else would have happened. If I pay your debt instead of you, then the counterfactual is: if I had not paid your debt, then you would have had to pay it. Substitution has this sort of logic. If Christ had not taken our punishment, then we would have received it.
The trouble is that, to my eye, this logic doesn't fit with classical theism. If Christ takes our punishment instead of us, then there has to be some meaningful sense in which God was otherwise going to punish us. Yet classical theism says that God is immutable and eternally loving. God was never poised to punish us and then changed course. Simply put: God was never going punish us. But if God was never going to inflict the judgment Christ suffered, then, strictly speaking, Christ did not suffer instead of us. The counterfactual required by substitution isn't there.
Now, to return to the issue of yesterday's post, this doesn't mean that Christ's death has no objective significance for me. Quite the opposite. Christ enters into the human condition and makes the reality of sin and God's judgment upon it visible. Christ reveals the grievousness of sin, the estrangement that sin produces, and the reality of death—all objectively real situations. But I do not think the logic of “substitution” applies to this theophany.
Second, what about the penalty? Here things continue to be snarly. The juridical metaphor, if read too literally, can make it seem that God suffers under some necessity. You see this in statements like, “God demands justice,” or, “God's justice requires a penalty.” The notion is that God is unable to forgive us without a cost, payment, ransom, or penalty. Thus, God is necessarily compelled to punish in order to forgive. His justice demands it. And it's this penal metaphor—read very woodenly and literally—that runs afoul of classical theism.
That said, objectively speaking, the relationship between God and humanity is changed and different after sin enters history. And humanity is affected by and suffers those consequences. For example, the ultimate consequence of sin is death. Not because God is punishing us. Death is, rather, the natural consequence of our separation from God, who is the source and ground of life. And this consequence is objective.
The cross, as a theophany, makes the reality of that consequence visible. Christ makes our entire predicament, in its objective reality, perfectly clear. Christ makes our sin visible, with its associated estrangement, and suffers the consequences of that estrangement in death. The whole sad reality comes into focus. The cross is the visible representation of what sin does to creatures who have separated themselves from God.
From the vantage of classical theism, nothing here requires a change in God. God is not required to punish Christ. Christ's death is not necessary in order for God to forgive. The theophany is a free act of love. Nor does God move from wrath to mercy on the cross. Rather, on the cross, Christ, in our place and as our representative, suffers and thereby brings into view our objective situation as sinners before God. And, at the very same time, Christ brings into view how God has overcome our estrangement and its consequences.
Finally, divine sanction. This criterion is easier. The Father divinely sanctions the Son's work. Because God so loved the world, God sent his Son to be the divine theophany. And not just on the cross, but in his incarnation, his life and teachings, his death, and his resurrection.
The Father does not need to punish the Son in order to forgive us. Rather, God sanctions the Son's representative and theophanic mission. The Father sanctions the Son's entry into our condition, including our suffering, estrangement, and death, so that the reality of sin and the reconciling love of God might be made visible.
Stepping back, where does all this leave us? Can McNall's minimalist account of “mere penal substitution” be reconciled with classical theism? I'm doubtful. It is true that “mere” penal substitution removes a lot of unnecessary baggage, but it still retains the basic logic of substitution and penalty. And both concepts seem to require the same thing: an if–then counterfactual logic about a judgment that would otherwise have fallen upon us. But if God was never going to execute that judgment, then Christ cannot properly be said to substitute for us in receiving it. And if there was never a penalty God was going to impose upon us, then calling the consequences of sin a “penalty” risks importing a juridical reality that simply wasn't there.
Which brings us back to the argument I made in The Book of Love. The cross is best understood as a theophany. And the vision is bivalent. The cross reveals both the grievousness of sin, in its objective reality, and the reconciling love of God, also in its objective reality. The cross tells the truth about sin, and it tells the truth about God. Judgment and reconciliation are held together in the same event. The cross is not a window into a transaction taking place within the life of God, where divine justice is satisfied and divine mercy is released. The cross is the historical manifestation of the God who is love. And in that manifestation we see, with terrible clarity, both the judgment of sin and the reconciliation of God.
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